Juristitoimitusjohtajat ja yrityksen riskinotto by Kaidesoja, Joel
LAWYER CEOS AND CORPORATE RISK-TAKING
Evidence from S&P 1500 companies
Master’s Thesis
Joel Kaidesoja
Aalto University School of Business
Master’s Programme in Finance
Spring 2018
Aalto University, P.O. BOX 11000, 00076 AALTO
www.aalto.fi
Abstract of master’s thesis
Author Joel Kaidesoja
Title of thesis Lawyer CEOs and corporate risk-taking
Degree Master of Science (Economics and Business Administration)
Degree programme Master’s Programme in Finance
Thesis advisor(s) Markku Kaustia
Year of approval 2018 Number of pages 72 Language English
Abstract
The purpose of this thesis is to study how lawyer CEOs affect corporate risk-taking. Chief executives
with a law degree comprise 9% of S&P 1500 CEOs but have not received wide attention in the
growing CEO-focused corporate finance literature. Lawyers are generally perceived as risk-averse
due to their education and previous career that typically focuses on understanding, controlling and
mitigating risks. The goal of this thesis is to empirically assess whether this potential risk-aversion
affects corporate policies.
   I use OLS regressions to estimate the dependency between lawyer CEOs and investment, capital
structure and acquisition variables, and find that lawyer CEOs associate with lower capital
expenditure, lower R&D investments, higher leverage and lower cash-to-assets ratios. I find no
effect for acquisition likelihood or volume but show that lawyer CEOs have a significant positive
effect on cumulative abnormal stock returns surrounding acquisition announcements. The positive
returns are not explained by acquisition characteristics or a higher completion rate and are robust
to different sub-samples and time intervals. Finally, I do not find empirical support for risk-aversion
in stock option holding behavior of lawyer CEOs.
   The empirical results suggest differences in corporate policies for companies with lawyer CEOs
compared to the baseline, but general lawyer CEO risk-aversion is not established. Rather it appears
that lawyer CEOs are averse towards certain policies such as capital expenditures and R&D
investment, which have been shown to increase the company’s litigation risk, while being less risk-
averse towards other corporate policies such as the capital structure of the company.
   The most significant finding of my thesis is documenting 1.4 percentage points higher cumulative
announcement day returns in the three-day period [-1, +1] surrounding the announcement of a large
acquisition. Based on previous research, I formulate three potential explanations for the result.
Lawyer CEOs may be more effective in managing investor expectations which would decrease the
negative surprise typically related to acquisitions. They may also be more talented in navigating the
legal complexity of acquisitions and mitigating their litigation risk. Finally, lawyer CEOs may
announce better acquisitions due to better negotiation outcomes or improved target selection.
   My thesis has significant contribution to finance literature and increases our understanding of
CEOs, specifically lawyer CEOs, and their effect on firm policies. Further academic extensions of the
thesis include studying lawyer CEOs in takeover target companies to better understand the causal
effects of observed higher announcement returns. Studies could also be extended to other traditional
areas of finance research such as innovativeness, IPO underpricing or stock returns. Finally, my
thesis also provides practical implications to for example boards making CEO hiring decisions,
investors reacting to CEO appointments and acquisition announcements, and lawyer CEOs
themselves in understanding potential biases affecting their own decision making.
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Tiivistelmä
Tämä tutkielma tutkii juristitoimitusjohtajien vaikutusta yritysten riskinottoon. Yhdeksän
prosentilla S&P 1500 -yritysten toimitusjohtajista ovat juristeja. Siitä huolimatta tämä erityisryhmä
ei ole saanut merkittävää huomiota kasvavassa toimitusjohtajiin keskittyvässä akateemisessa
tutkimuksessa. Juristeja pidetään tyypillisesti riskiä karttavina, johtuen heidän koulutuksestaan ja
työstään joka keskittyy riskien ymmärtämiseen ja hallintaan. Tämän tutkielman tavoite on
empiirisesti analysoida, kuinka toimitusjohtajan juristitausta vaikuttaa yrityksen toimintatapoihin.
Käytän pienimmän neliösumman menetelmää analysoidakseni juristitoimitusjohtaja-muuttujan
sekä investointeihin, pääomarakenteeseen sekä yrityskauppoihin liittyvien muuttujien yhteyttä.
Regressioiden mukaan juristitoimitusjohtajien johtamilla yrityksillä on pienemmät investoinnit,
enemmän velkaa sekä vähemmän kassavaroja kuin muilla yrityksillä. Yrityskauppojen
lukumäärässä ei ole merkittäviä eroja, mutta juristitoimitusjohtajat assosioivat voimakkaasti
korkeampien yrityskaupan julkaisua ympäröivien osaketuottojen kanssa. Korkeampia tuottoja eivät
selitä yrityskauppojen ominaisuudet tai toteutumistodennäköisyydet, ja tulokset pitävät eri
aikaintervalleille ja osaotoksille.
Empiiriset tulokset viittaavat siihen, että yrityksien välisiä eroja voidaan osittain selittää
toimitusjohtajan juristitaustalla. Yleinen riskin karttaminen ei kuitenkaan saa täyttä empiiristä
tukea. Vaikuttaa ennemminkin siltä, että juristitoimitusjohtajat suhtautuvat tiettyihin oikeudellista
riskiä lisääviin päätöksiin kuten investointeihin riskiä karttavasti, joka ei kuitenkaan reflektoidu
kaikkiin päätöksiin kuten esimerkiksi pääomarakenteeseen tai yrityskauppojen lukumäärään.
Tutkielmani tärkein löydös on 1.4 prosenttiyksikköä korkeampien kumulatiivisten osaketuottojen
dokumentointi suurta yrityskauppaa ympäröivien kolmen päivän [-1, +1] aikana. Aikaisempaan
akateemiseen tutkimukseen pohjaten muodostan kolme selitystä tulokselle. Juristitoimitusjohtajat
saattavat olla tehokkaampia sijoittajien odotusten hallinnassa, joka voisi vähentää yrityskauppoihin
liittyvää yllätystä. Juristitoimitusjohtajat saattavat myös olla taitavampia hallitsemaan
yrityskauppoihin liittyviä oikeudellisia seikkoja, vähentäen niistä johtuvaa riskiä.
Juristitoimitusjohtajat saattavat myös saavuttaa parempia lopputuloksia kauppojen neuvotteluissa.
Tutkielmani edistää olemassa olevaa rahoituksen tutkimusta lisäämällä ymmärrystämme
yrityksen toimitusjohtajien taustan, etenkin juristitaustan, vaikutusta yritysten toimintatapoihin.
Mahdollisia jatkotutkimuksia ovat lakimiesten tutkiminen yrityskaupan kohteena olevien yritysten
toimitusjohtajina, sekä laajentaminen muihin rahoituksen tutkimusaloihin kuten osakeantien
hinnoitteluun, innovointiin tai osaketuottoihin. Tutkielmallani on käytännön implikaatioita
esimerkiksi yritysten hallituksille, jotka valitsevat toimitusjohtajia, sekä sijoittajille jotka reagoivat
toimitusjohtajanimityksiin. Tutkielmani tuo myös itse juristitoimitusjohtajille uusia näkökulmia
mahdollisten omien ennakkoluulojen sekä niiden päätöksentekovaikutusten ymmärtämiseen.
Avainsanat Johtajakäyttäytyminen, juristitoimitusjohtajat, yrityksen toimintatavat, yrityskaupat
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31. Introduction
Half of my career was spent as a lawyer… I joke that law school consists of taking normal people
and getting them to worry about what no sane person would worry about. There’s a level of worrying
that comes with that I guess you keep. –Francis (Frank) Blake, CEO of Home Depot from 2007 to
2014 (Institutional Investor, 28.10.2011)
1.1 Background and motivation
A law degree is not the most typical education for a CEO, which likely relates to the stereotypes
attached to the lawyers’ profession. Lawyers are often portrayed as cautious, risk-averse and the
“naysayers” of a company. Their education, and often subsequent career, is focused on understanding,
controlling and mitigating risks and thus being cautious seems like a natural trait for a successful
lawyer. Lawyer risk-aversion is generally accepted which is easy to notice by searching for related
business press articles: “risk-averse lawyers” yields over 5 times more Google search hits than
“overconfident lawyers”. Notable business publications such as Wall Street Journal (2013), Financial
Times (2016) and Forbes (2018) have described lawyers or their profession as risk-averse.
Risk-aversion, however, is not intuitive for describing a successful CEO. Risk is connected with
reward, and bold strategies executed by visionary leaders are the ones that reach front page news. It
is likely that for example an MBA education assigns more focus on potential upside from risk-taking
than an education in law, and thus it would seem like a more suitable education for a future CEO.
Nevertheless, there is a clear need for CEOs with legal expertise. The regulatory environment has
become more complex with laws such as the Sarbanes-Oxley act that set new standards for reporting,
governance and transparency, and where non-compliance may lead to severe litigation and charges.
Furthermore, the law degree has certain prestige attached to it due to the long and demanding period
of education required to be awarded one. This may allow lawyers to venture outside their educational
boundaries to take more strategic positions within companies such as the role of a CEO.
Consequently, approximately 9% of CEOs in S&P 1500 companies have a law degree
(Henderson, Hutton, Jiang and Pierson, 2017). Lawyer CEOs are present across industries and have
been employed for example within manufacturing firms such as Cisco, financial institutions such as
Bank of America, pharmaceutical companies such as Merck and Actavis or consumer product
companies such as Home Depot and Altria. Due to their specific education and non-trivial occurrence
in large companies, lawyer CEOs are an interesting group of executives to study which has to date
been relatively lightly covered in academic literature studying the effects of CEOs on corporate
policies.
41.2 Research question
This thesis studies how having a CEO with legal expertise affects corporate risk-taking. The
effects a CEO has on corporate policies has been a growing topic of study: CEOs have a significant
influence on corporate decisions (Graham, Harvey and Puri 2013) and manager fixed effects are
shown to robustly explain heterogeneity in corporate policies (Bertrand and Schoar 2003). Easily
observable  characteristics  such  as  age  and  gender  are  shown  to  affect  corporate  policies  such  as
acquisitiveness (Huang and Kisgen 2013, Yim 2013), while studies have also been conducted on
more specific CEO experiences such as military background (see e.g., Bamber, Jiang and Wang 2010,
Lin, Ma, Officer and Zou 2011, Malmendier, Tate and Yan 2011, Benmelech and Frydman 2015) or
exposure to natural disasters (Bernile, Bhagwat and Rau 2017).
A less studied channel which may affect corporate policies is the CEOs work experience. Schoar
and Zuo (2017) show that CEO management styles are affected by the timing of entering the
workforce, more specifically whether a future CEO begins her career during recession or during an
economically prosperous period. The authors argue that an important channel through which
recessions affect CEOs is through the allocation of their first job, which robustly explains much of
the effect a recession has on the CEOs management style. Thus, it is surprising that only few work-
experience related CEO studies have been conducted. One limitation to studying the effect of work
experience is the availability of data: while some databases such as Marquis Who’s Who collect CEO
work experience information, the data often requires hand-picking of specific work experiences,
limiting potential sample size and thus the reliability of the study.
While work experience data is burdensome to collect, information on the executives’ education
is more comprehensively documented. A distinguishable educational background is possessing a law
degree, which at the very least means that the CEO has received education in law, but in most cases
also  means  that  the  individual  has  worked  as  a  lawyer  before  becoming a  CEO (Henderson  et  al.
2017). But are companies with lawyer CEOs managed differently? The findings of Henderson et al.
(2017) suggest so, as lawyer CEOs are shown to associate with lower litigation frequency, less severe
litigation, lower investments in R&D and tangible assets, and lower stock price volatility.
In this thesis, I expand the study of Henderson et al. (2017) to cover capital structure and
acquisitiveness as well as acquisition outcomes. The accumulated legal expertise, personal traits or
other factors specific for lawyer CEOs may result in differences in how companies are managed. If
lawyer CEOs indeed are more risk-averse than their non-lawyer peers, as often suggested by business
press, this could be reflected in corporate decisions such as leverage, the cash-to-assets ratio, and the
5number  or  type  of  acquisitions.  Furthermore,  it  may  also  affect  acquisition  outcomes  such  as
announcement  day  returns  or  the  completion  rate.  Conversely,  however,  it  is  also  possible  that  a
lawyer CEO has positive effect towards these corporate policies, as lawyers may be more skilled in
assuring banks to grant debt, or in navigating through acquisitions that often have various and
complex legal considerations and litigation risk attached to them.
1.3 Main findings and contribution
I find that lawyer CEOs associate with lower investment in R&D and tangible assets, confirming
the findings of Henderson et al. (2017). However, the conservativeness suggested by lower
investment is not extended to capital structure decisions, as companies with lawyer CEOs have higher
leverage  and  lower  cash-to-assets,  both  of  which  are  statistically  significant  effects.  I  find  no
statistically significant effect for lawyer CEOs in studying the likelihood of announcing a large
acquisition. The most significant finding of my thesis is that cumulative abnormal returns for the
three-day period [-1, +1] surrounding acquisition announcements are 1.4 percentage points higher for
acquisitions announced by companies with a lawyer CEO than for the rest of the sample. This finding
is statistically significant at the 1% level, is not explained by other acquisition characteristics or the
completion rate of acquisitions, and holds for different sub-samples and time intervals.
Furthermore, I study lawyer CEO risk-aversion which is partially used to explain the findings of
Henderson et al. (2017). Following Malmendier and Tate (2005) I study the option holding behaviour
of lawyer CEOs to assess their level of overconfidence. While generally accepted by the public,
lawyer risk-aversion is less documented in academic studies, and it is much less established than for
example risk-aversion related to gender (Huang and Kisgen 2013) or age (Yim 2013). In fact,
Goodman-Delahunty, Granhag, Hartwig and Loftus (2010) show that lawyers are overconfident in
estimating their likelihood of success in case outcomes. The finding outlines the importance in
academically evaluating lawyer risk-aversion, rather than accepting it as a given due to the public
image of the lawyer’s profession. I do not find significant risk-aversion in lawyer CEOs. In fact,
lawyer CEOs tend to be more likely to hold options that are 67% in the money, hold options until the
end  of  their  expiration,  and  to  be  net  buyers  of  company  shares,  which  are  all  consistent  with
overconfident behaviour (Malmendier and Tate, 2005).
The contribution of my thesis is adding to the growing CEO literature studying how manager
specific effects, both self-imposed and external, affect corporate policies. Lawyer-specific studies are
scarce and have mostly focused on law-related factors such as litigation. To my understanding, my
thesis is among the first papers that studies the relation between lawyer CEOs and acquisitiveness. It
6is also one of the first studies to explicitly study lawyer conservativeness in a corporate finance
setting. My thesis adds to the broader corporate finance literature on acquisitiveness, expanding the
potential reasons for acquisitions beyond the traditional cash-flow and valuation –related
explanations (see e.g., Jensen and Meckling 1976, Jensen 1986, Schleifer and Vishny 2003). While
my thesis does not intend to answer the question whether or not lawyers are better or worse CEOs in
general, my findings provide insight in evaluating what type of companies or strategies could be
enhanced by having a lawyer at the helm of the firm.
As lawyer CEOs are a non-trivial group of executives, it is valuable to understand the differences
and their potential explanations for corporate policies. Knowledge of these aspects may be important
for boards when making hiring decisions, investors reacting to new information on a CEO hire, and
CEOs themselves in evaluating potential biases that affect their decision making. My findings may
also be applicable for designing and analysing top management incentive schemes, which may in the
future more effectively account for manager specific factors to steer companies towards more
desirable decisions and performance. Finally, the findings of my thesis will give ground for further
academic research on the effects a CEOs background may have in corporate decision making, and
suggest new areas to be examined. As the quality of CEO work experience information increases,
more studies regarding the CEOs career path will be feasible, potentially increasing our ability to
evaluate the value and effect of the past experiences of an executive.
1.4 Limitations of the study
There are several limitations affecting my study. The methodology allows to study correlation
but not conclusively establish causality, and thus it is possible that unobserved factors correlating
with both the dependent and independent variables are causing the observed results. For example, if
lawyers are in fact more conservative, it is difficult to differentiate whether it is the law education or
innate conservativeness which is driving the observed results. This concern is addressed by
controlling for various CEO-specific characteristics consistent with previous CEO literature, as well
as explicitly testing lawyer CEOs for overconfidence. Another complicating factor is that results may
also be affected by endogeneity in CEO-firm matching. It may be that a CEO looking to utilize certain
policies may choose to join a company that is already embracing these policies. To mitigate this issue,
I utilize a difference-in-differences approach as a robustness check for the results, which limits sample
size but allows me to study changes in corporate policies post CEO transition.
Endogeneity may also work the other way. It is possible that companies looking to change their
policies choose to hire a CEO with a background as a lawyer, a limitation that is not fully controlled
7in this study. However, this limitation will not affect the validity of the results, only their
interpretations. While reliable causality cannot be established, it is interesting and insightful to
observe correlations between lawyer CEOs and firm policies. As Malmendier and Tate (2005) argue,
boards should be aware of the “dark sides” of CEO characteristics such as overconfidence, even
though the characteristics would be the reason for hiring the executive in the first place. Finally, there
are also data-driven limitations to the study due to the utilization of five separate databases to
construct the sample, leading to many observations being omitted due to lack of data. These
limitations and their mitigations are further discussed in Chapter Four.
1.5 Structure of the thesis
The rest of the thesis is organized as following. I review CEO literature in Chapter Two, and
present the hypotheses in Chapter Three. Data and methodology is presented in Chapter Four and the
empirical results in Chapter Five. Chapter Six presents the results of robustness analyses and Chapter
Seven discusses the results. Chapter Eight concludes the thesis.
2. Review of prior literature
There have been several distinguishable developments in the market for CEOs within the last
century. CEOs have received more mobility (Murphy and Zabojnik 2004), shifted towards generalists
as opposed to specialists (Frydman forthcoming) and experienced a significant increase in pay
(Edemans, Gabaix and Jenter 2017). This Chapter begins by reviewing and analysing the recent trends
in the executive market in Section 2.1. In Section 2.2 I review research studying the impact of CEOs,
and in Section 2.3 I review agency conflicts and cognitive limitations, the most common explanations
for how managers affect corporate policies. In Section 2.4 I provide an overview of research on how
other CEO characteristics, both external and self-imposed, may affect corporate policies, and in
Section 2.5 I focus on how work experience could affect CEO decision making. I finish the literature
review in Section 2.6 with lawyer-specific research.
2.1 Recent developments in the market for CEOs
Although the CEO undeniably has influence over the company, the magnitude of this influence
is debated. On one extreme theorists argue for a perfect CEO-market, in which individual managers
are seen as completely replaceable and non-value-adding to the company that is ultimately steered by
the shareholders (Bertrand and Schoar 2003). However, the growing amount of CEO compensation
documented by e.g. Murphy and Zabojnik (2004) and Edmans et al. (2017) does not align with an
argument of a perfect market for managers. The commonly accepted view is that CEOs possess skills
and influence the company to an extent, but that the magnitude of the effect is difficult to quantify.
8The market for CEOs has undergone important developments over the last century. There seems
to be a growing emphasis on the CEOs skillset evident from the increase in the share of externally
recruited CEOs (Frydman forthcoming), which for S&P 500 companies rose from 15% in 1970 to
26% in 1990. The shift towards externally recruited CEOs suggests that inside information from
within  the  company  or  existing  relationships  with  other  directors  carry  less  emphasis  than  before
(Murphy and Zabojnik 2004). When firm-specific information is less important, the search for a new
executive can be widened from intra-firm candidates to the executive market in general, even outside
the industry sector of the company. The education of CEOs has simultaneously shifted towards a
business degree, while earlier in the century having a technical education was more common for
managers (Frydman forthcoming). Benmelech and Frydman (2015) show that the number of MBA
CEOs has risen from 16% in 1980 to 35% in 2006 for large publicly listed companies.
Bertrand (2009) explains the trend towards more generalist CEOs by the development that firms
today utilise more complicated financial instruments and require sophisticated strategies to stay
competitive. Technology development has led to higher performance of information systems which
increases the amount of knowledge available for executive decision making and allows for an
increased number of managers reporting directly to the CEO (Bertrand 2009). Frydman (forthcoming)
argues that the increased importance of general management skills as well as asymmetric information
in the executive market have led to a higher mobility of CEOs, increased pay and larger salary
inequalities across managers within a firm. The author also notes that the average number of
industries where the manager has worked has increased, further suggesting that general management
knowledge is more important than firm- or even industry-specific knowledge.
A range of constraints in the executive job market, such as self-serving activist investors, biased
business press or ineffective executive search companies, have become common over the past
decades (Khurana 2002). Certain skills such as convincing communication with investors or the press
may receive more focus in the CEO hiring process than what would be necessary from the job
positions’ point of view. Khurana (2002) argues that the identification of managerial talent may be
sub-optimal, as executive search companies are often used to legitimize the CEO choice the board
has already made, rather than to identify and promote new candidates for the position. Suggesting
further market imperfections, Bertrand (2009) argues that some specific groups such as females or
family members are over- or underrepresented in the C-suite. While the share of females as CEOs for
major U.S. companies has grown from 0.5% in 1994 to 1.5% in 2005, and from 3.0% to 7.5% for
CFOs respectively (Huang and Kisgen 2013), females are still significantly underrepresented.
Bertrand (2009) suggests that this may be related to pipeline issues, as historically men have been
9much more likely to hold an MBA degree than women1. However, the share of female CEOs has
grown much slower than the share of female MBA students, suggesting that this can only be a partial
explanation. Other explanations have been the glass ceiling argument, i.e. that females are
discriminated against by the corporations themselves or their shareholders (Bertrand 2009). There
may also be negative conceptions of female managerial ability as argued by Wolfers (2006). Finally,
women may face more severe career-family trade-offs that may explain their underrepresentation
(Bertrand 2009).
The persistence of family CEOs, i.e. executives who are related to the founder of the company,
the previous CEO, or to a large shareholder (Perez-Gonzalez 2006), is also an area of research interest.
There are some arguments in favor of family CEOs: the interests of family CEOs may be better
aligned with shareholders due to the share ownership of the family or they may have a more long-
term view (Bertrand and Schoar 2006) which would explain their overrepresentation in the CEO
population. However, when choosing a family member for the executive position the pool for
potential candidates is significantly smaller than for unrelated CEOs, suggesting that the most talented
individual may not be chosen. Indeed, it seems that the market assigns a negative weight for family
CEOs as suggested by Perez-Gonzalez (2006) who shows that unrelated CEO appointment
announcements carry positive abnormal returns which are not present when a related CEO
appointment is announced. Furthermore, the author shows that operating performance is negatively
correlated with family CEOs.
A CEO characteristic that has significantly decreased over the past years is military experience.
Benmelech and Frydman (2015) document that the share of CEOs who have served in the military
has decreased from 59% to 6% from 1980 to 2006. While a large part of the trend is likely related to
pipeline issues i.e. to the fact that executives who served in World War II have exited the pool of
potential CEOs as they have become old, it is likely also related to the trend of valuing generalist and
business expertise over military merits. Interestingly, CEOs with a background in law have also
significantly increased over the last decades (Bagley 2008, Litov, Sepe and Whitehead 2014), one of
the main motivators for this thesis in particular. The increase is likely related to pressure from
regulators as well as a more complicated risk environment in which companies benefit from the CEOs
legal expertise. Consequently, approximately 9% of S&P 1500 companies have CEO with a law
degree (Henderson et al. 2017).
1 In 1970, over 95% of students that graduated from MBA programs in U.S. were male (Bertrand, 2009).
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2.2 The impact of CEOs
The increased availability of manager specific data has allowed more research on the way CEOs
affect corporate decision making. According to the upper echelons theory the company’s performance
and strategic decisions can be predicted, to an extent, by characteristics related to the managers of the
company (Hambrick and Mason 1984). Bertrand and Schoar (2003) track individual managers across
different companies and show that a significant amount of heterogeneity in a range of firm policies
such as investment, financing and organizational practices are explained by effects attributable to
manager fixed effects. In other words, managers seem to have a distinguishable managing style which
they incorporate throughout their career, and which significantly affects the decisions taken by the
companies they manage. Similarly, Bamber et al. (2010) track individual managers and find that they
have unique disclosure styles that significantly influence their companies’ voluntary disclosures.
Bennedsen, Perez-Gonzales and Wolfenzon (2011) provide further support for the argument that
CEOs matter by showing that CEO deaths have a strong correlation with operating profitability
declines. In addition, the authors show that deaths of the CEOs immediate family members are
strongly correlated with performance declines, arguing that the family members’ deaths decrease the
CEOs ability to focus on managing the company. On the contrary, board member deaths do not seem
to have a significant effect on performance, suggesting that CEOs are more important for operating
profitability, an intuitive result given that board members typically distribute their attention to various
firms as opposed to the CEO. Utilizing a unique dataset of CEO candidates for private equity and
venture capital –related companies, Kaplan, Klebanov and Sorensen (2012) show that the company’s
performance after the hiring of a new CEO is positively correlated with the selected CEOs general
ability and execution skills, providing further evidence that CEOs do matter.
Evaluating the extent to which CEOs affect corporate decisions, Adams, Almeida and Ferreira
(2005) study powerful CEOs. The authors evaluate the power of a CEO by using different measures
such as whether the CEO is the founder of the company, whether he is the only insider board member,
and whether the company is in an industry where CEOs are likely to have a lot of power over
decisions. The authors find that companies with powerful CEOs have significantly higher stock return
variability, suggesting that when CEOs have more power in the company corporate policies may be
more affected by CEO specific characteristics such as her opinions (Adams et al. 2005).
Accepting that CEOs do make a difference, however, provides only limited insight unless we
understand what distinguishable characteristics are important, and which decisions they affect. Thus,
the following sections focus on specific CEO characteristics and their effects on corporate policies.
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2.3 Agency conflicts and cognitive limitations
Agency conflicts and cognitive limitations have received the most attention in explaining how
CEOs can affect  their  companies (Bertrand 2009).  The interests of CEOs may differ with those of
shareholders despite the existence of incentive packages with the purpose of aligning interests, which
results in agency conflicts (Jensen and Meckling 1976). One such agency issue is empire building,
i.e. growing the company to beyond shareholder-maximizing size, towards which CEOs have several
incentives. They may receive personal benefits e.g. in the form of higher status or increased fame, as
well as monetary benefits from increased salaries as CEOs running larger companies tend to be paid
better (Gabaix and Landier 2008). Diversifying the company can also be attractive from the CEOs
point of view given most of the executive’s human capital is invested in the single company she is
running, and thus declines in the company’s industry may have severely negative outcomes for the
CEO. Entering other industries can diversify the CEOs exposure towards industry-risk, while it may
not be optimal from the shareholders point of view who could diversify simply by buying stocks in
other companies. Complicating the organization through growing it in size may also entrench the
CEO, making it harder to replace her due to the large amount of firm-specific understanding required
to manage the company. The manager’s risk of unemployment may also be decreased by entrenching
investments that are projects or acquisitions that require, and reward certain skills possessed by the
CEO (Schleifer and Vishny 1989).
There are a few contradicting studies to the generally accepted empire building view. Bertrand
and Mullainathan (2003) study plant-level data through the passing of anti-takeover laws and find
that when takeover threat is reduced, both the destruction of old plants and the creation of new plants
falls. This is contrary to empire building, which would suggest that weakened governance through
the lower threat of a takeover should lead to increased firm size. The authors conclude that managers
may instead be enjoying the quiet life, i.e. avoid difficult and cognitively challenging questions of
shutting down old plants or building new ones when they are not under pressure. Similarly, Bertrand
(2009) argues that CEO entrenchment might be a factor decreasing acquisition propensity as tenured
CEOs put  less  emphasis  on  the  identification  of  acquisition  targets  to  maintain  the  status  quo  and
enjoy less stress from having to manage acquisitions.
An increasing focus on behavioral corporate finance research suggests that cognitive limitations
and biases may affect CEOs and thus corporate decisions. CEO overconfidence has been vastly
studied and documented. Ben-David, Graham and Harvey (2013) show that executives utilize too
narrow confidence intervals, documenting that executives realize market returns that are in their 80%
confidence interval only 36% of the time. Overconfidence also affects corporate policies:
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overconfident CEOs use less equity financing, are more likely to invest when internal funds are
available and overestimate future returns from investments (Malmendier and Tate 2005, Ben-David
et al. 2013). Furthermore, overconfident managers undertake more acquisitions, while announcement
day returns for acquisitions announced by overconfident CEOs tend to be lower (Malmendier and
Tate 2008). Companies with overconfident CEOs are more likely to issue optimistic forecasts (Hribar
and Yang 2016) and associate with higher likelihood of financial misreporting (Schrand and Zechman
2012). Overconfidence, however, also bears some positive effects. Galasso and Simcoe (2011) show
that CEO overconfidence is positively correlated with innovation outcomes of the company2, which
is intuitive as overconfident CEOs are likely to take more risk which typically is required for
successful innovation. In line with their findings, Hirshleifer, Low and Teoh (2012) show that
companies with overconfident CEOs have higher stock price volatility, invest more in research and
development and have more successful innovation outcomes.
Overconfidence is not the only cognitive bias affecting executive decision making. Anchoring,
which is excessively relying on first piece information which may even be completely irrelevant from
the decision-making point of view (Tversky and Kahneman 1974) is shown to affect corporate
decisions. While the effect of anchoring tends to be smaller for experienced professionals than
individuals with less experience (Kaustia, Alho and Puttonen 2008), its effect is documented for top
executives  as  well.  For  example,  acquisition  outcomes  are  shown  to  be  affected  by  anchoring  as
executives, both in the acquiring and in the target firm, are influenced by prior peak stock prices
(Baker, Pan and Wurgler 2012). Interestingly, anchoring has also been studied in a legal setting as
random irrelevant sentencing demands is shown to affect judicial sentencing decisions (Englich,
Mussweiler and Strack 2006).
2.4 Other self-imposed and external CEO characteristics
In addition to the studies on agency conflicts and cognitive biases, a range of self-imposed and
external CEO characteristics have been studied and used to explain differences in how companies are
managed.  A common area  of  research  has  been  studying  how the  background of  the  CEO affects
corporate  policies.  Mullins  and  Schoar  (2016)  show  that  family  CEOs  tend  to  perceive  their  role
differently than unrelated CEOs, exhibiting a stakeholder-view with more focus on employees and
debtholders compared to unrelated CEOs who are more focused on shareholders. Companies with
family CEOs also tend to have lower operating profits and market-to-book ratios (Perez-Gonzales
2006), and the negative effect is amplified when the family CEO has not attended a selective
2 Measured by patent count and subsequent citation count of the patents (Galasso and Simcoe 2011).
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undergraduate institution, suggesting that education does matter. The finding is consistent with
Bertrand and Schoar (2003) who show that MBA CEOs are associated with better operative
performance.
The CEOs childhood experiences also seem to affect how companies are managed. Malmendier
et al. (2011) show that CEOs living through the Great Depression are more likely to rely on internal
finance and less likely to use debt financing. The findings are consistent with Malmendier and Nagel
(2011), who show that individuals who have lived through times of low stock market returns are more
conservative i.e. have a lower willingness to take financial risk, are less likely to own stock, predict
lower stock returns and invest a lower share of their wealth in stocks if they participate. Bernile et al.
(2017) study the effect of fatal disasters experienced by CEOs during their early-life and find an
inverse U-curve for risk-aversion: CEOs who experience disasters without extreme downsides had a
tendency for aggressive behaviour observable from higher leverage and lower cash holdings, whereas
CEOs at the extreme tail of natural disaster exposure exhibit risk-averse policies. The time of entering
the job market also seems to play a role in managerial style as well as career outcomes. Oyer (2008)
examines Stanford MBA students who entered investment banking, noticing that those graduating
during the bull markets of the mid 1980s and early 1990s had a higher probability for starting a career
on Wall Street, and to work longer and earn more in the industry, than their graduate peers who enter
the work market during a the stock market bust of 1988-1989 and 1993-1994. Schoar and Zuo (2017)
show  that  companies  with  CEOs  who  began  their  career  during  a  recession  execute  conservative
policies in capital expenditures, R&D, leverage and working capital needs when compared to
companies with a CEO who has joined the labour force during an economically prosperous period.
In addition to background, personal characteristics are shown to explain corporate policies. Yim
(2013) shows that younger CEOs have a higher likelihood of announcing a large acquisition, and that
acquisitions announced by younger CEOs tend to have lower announcement day returns. A large
acquisition increased the CEOs compensation by an average of $300 000 a year, and this increase
persisted throughout the CEOs career giving younger CEOs higher incentives to pursue acquisitions.
The likelihood of being replaced after a poor quality acquisition3 was roughly the same as when no
acquisitions were undertaken, further skewing incentives towards acqisitions (Yim 2013). The
findings are in line with Bertrand and Schoar (2003), who show that older CEOs tend to have more
conservative management policies with regard to capital expenditures, leverage and cash holdings.
3 A poor quality acquisition was one that fell into the lowest quartile of cumulative abnormal returns in the sample (Yim
2013).
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The physical appearance of the CEO is also found to affect corporate policies. Cook and Mobbs
(2017) measure executive facial attractiveness and find that attractive new CEOs are associated with
better operating performance in homogenous industries, evident from higher sales and better long-
run abnormal stock returns. Furthermore, attractive CEOs exhibit higher abnormal earnings upon the
announcement of their appointment, suggesting that markets also view the CEOs physical appearance
as firm-value enhancing. Attractive CEOs are also found to associate with higher announcement day
returns for the acquisitions their companies announce (Halford and Hsu 2013). Graham, Harvey and
Puri (2015) show that CEOs whose appearance is perceived as more competent4 tend to manage larger
firms and receive higher salaries, although no link is found between perceived competence and actual
corporate performance.
Another extensively studied physical factor affecting managerial decisions is the gender of the
CEO. Huang and Kisgen (2013) examine the differences in corporate policies between male- and
female-led companies and argue that overconfidence is more present in male executives throughout
different corporate decisions such as acquisitiveness and debt issuance. Female CEO issue less debt
and undertake less acquisitions, while the acquisitions that they do execute have approximately 2%
higher announcement day returns than those announced by their male peers (Huang and Kisgen 2013).
Gender can also affect managerial decisions through the CEOs children, as argued by Dahl, Dezso
and Ross (2012) who study male CEOs in Danish firms between 1996 and 2006 and show that the
birth of a son to the CEO has a more negative effect on wages paid to the company’s employees than
that of the birth of a daughter. The authors show that if the daughter is the CEO’s first, wages even
tend to increase within the company. Marriage, another family-related event, is shown to drive more
conservative investment policies and lower stock return volatility which is not explained by innate
heterogeneity in CEOs (Roussanov and Savor 2014).
Personal values and attitudes, often proxied by political preferences, are also shown to affect
financial decisions such as stock market participation (Kaustia and Torstila 2009) or stock selection
(Hong and Kostovetsky 2012). These effects also extend to CEOs. Republican executives exhibit
more conservative corporate policies, which is explained by their conservative ideologies (Hutton,
Jiang and Kumar 2014). The authors show that companies managed by republicans have lower
leverage and invest less in capital expenditures or R&D. Psychological traits of the manager also
affect corporate decisions. Using a survey-based approach, Graham et al. (2013) show that companies
4 The authors find that a high competence score is linked to the maturity score of the executives face, i.e. that baby-faced
CEOs are perceived as less competent, a potentially worrisome finding as psychology literature suggests baby-faced
people often possess qualities opposite to the qualities projected by their looks (Graham et al. 2015).
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undertake more acquisitions when their CEO is risk-tolerant, and that companies led by optimistic
CEOs have more short-term debt than those led by their less optimistic peers. Culture is also likely
to affect management, as U.S. CEOs are more risk-tolerant and optimistic than non-U.S. CEOs
(Graham et al. 2013). Even the free-time preferences of CEOs is shown to explain corporate policies:
a CEOs hobby of flying airplanes is shown to associate with better innovation outcomes of the
company (Sunder, J., Sunder, S. and Zhang 2017). This is explained by sensation seeking i.e. the
search of varied, complex and intense sensations through taking physical, social, financial or legal
risk (Zuckerman 1971), which is typically related to risky behaviour such as gambling or speeding,
but is also shown to affect for example stock trading volumes (Grinblatt and Keloharju 2009).
2.5 Work experience of the CEO
In addition to studying the CEOs demographics, childhood or overconfidence, some research has
focused on the work experience of the CEO. A limitation to these studies has been the availability of
data, as well as the scarcity of certain backgrounds. For example, if one wanted to study former
investment bankers who became CEOs, the sample would require either a very long time window or
a wide range of companies, both of which significantly affect the availability of data.
Work experience, especially the first place of work after graduating, is shown to significantly
affect the career path of individuals and their decision making after becoming a CEO (Bertrand and
Schoar 2003). CEOs are argued to relate decision making situations to their past experiences
(Mintzberg 1973; Castanias and Helfat 1991) and newly hired CEOs are found to replicate successful
strategies from their previous organisations (Boeker 1997; Kraatz and Moore 2002). Studying the
semiconductor industry, Boeker (1997) shows that the managers’ exposure to different products and
strategies in their previous organization influence the product-market entries executed in the
executive’s new firm, especially if the new management team is small or has a short tenure. Studying
liberal arts colleges, Kraatz and Moore (2002) show that colleges were more likely to adopt
professional programs when led by newly hired presidents who had migrated from institutions that
offered such programs.
Due to a limited amount of data, only a few studies on the CEOs working background have been
published. A specific work background with enough available data is CEOs who have served in the
military. Bamber et al. (2010) show that military CEOs follow more precise disclosure styles, while
Malmendier et al. (2011) find that companies with military CEOs follow more aggressive capital
structures e.g. higher leverage than other companies. Lin et al. (2011) document that companies with
military CEOs have higher announcement day returns for their acquisitions, and that their deals
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exhibit stronger synergies. Benmelech and Frydman (2015) show that military CEOs tend to
implement more conservative policies such as lower corporate investment, a somewhat contradicting
finding to Malmendier et al. (2011). Benmelech and Frydman (2015) also show that military CEOs
maintain a higher level of ethicality as measured by the likeliness to be involved in corporate fraud.
Another work experience area studied is a CEOs background in finance. CEOs with a financial
background seem to be more sophisticated in evaluating investments: their investment decisions are
less sensitive to cash flows (Malmendier and Tate 2005, Custodia and Metzger 2014) and they are
more  likely  to  use  project-specific  discount  rates  rather  than  a  single  companywide  discount  rate
(Custodia and Metzger 2014). Companies with financial expert CEOs also tend to have less cash,
more debt, and implement more share repurchases (Custodia and Metzger 2014).
In general, the CEOs experience of certain situations seems to matter. Davidson, Elsaid and Wang
(2011) show the stock market reaction towards the announcements of outside CEO appointments is
more positive when the newly appointed CEO is an exCEO5. However, the authors also find that
firms hiring exCEOs have worse financial performance after the succession. The CEOs experience
from specific situations or projects has also been shown to affect corporate outcomes. Studying
takeovers, Bernile and Kang (2016) show that CEOs who have experience from leading companies
that have been targets of a takeover are able to negotiate higher returns or safer cash payments to their
shareholders than companies led by CEOs without takeover experience. The authors argue that this
is due to learning rather than skills or self-selection, and that the better outcomes do not come at the
price of other contractual concessions or at an increased risk of terminating negotiations. Furthermore,
firms managed by CEOs that have experienced distress earlier in their careers have lower leverage,
higher cash-to-assets ratios and lower investments (Dittmar and Duchin 2016). Custodia, Ferreira and
Matos (2013) show that CEOs with general managerial skills are seen as more valuable for companies
that are undertaking restructurings and acquisitions than CEOs with firm-specific skills.
In  addition  to  certain  skills,  previous  work  experience  may  expose  the  CEO  to  important
stakeholders that can affect corporate policies and a company’s success. Companies with politically
connected CEOs in China are shown to significantly outperform peers with non-connected CEOs in
terms of post-IPO stock returns (Fan, Wong and Zhang 2007), and they are more likely to appoint
other politically connected individuals to executive positions. Guner, Malmendier and Tate (2008)
show that companies with bankers as board members have better capital markets access and use more
5 exCEO is defined as executives who have held the CEO position for three years before being hired, and hold the CEO
position for three year after the hiring (Davidson et al. 2011).
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external financing, and that the increase in external funding occurs after commercial bankers join
boards. However, the increased use of external finance tends to benefit the financial institutions
serving the company rather than the company’s shareholders (Guner et al. 2008, Custodia and
Metzger 2014). Connections to other companies’ executives also affect corporate outcomes. Ishii and
Xuan (2014) show that existing social connections between directors and executives of acquiring and
target firms associate with lower announcement day returns. The authors also show that the likelihood
for the target firm’s CEO and former board members to continue as board members of the merged
company is higher when social connections between the acquirer’s and target’s executives exist.
Furthermore, target CEOs tend to receive higher bonuses post-merger when social ties with acquiring
managers exist, concluding that decisions may be distorted towards the benefit of the executives
rather than shareholders in the presence of pre-merger social ties (Ishii and Xuan 2014).
2.6 CEOs with legal expertise
My thesis focuses on the effect of CEO legal education. The number of lawyer CEOs in public
corporations has increased significantly over the last decades (Bagley 2008, Litov et al. 2014). The
functional background of the CEO (e.g. finance, legal, technical) is suggested to affect the way CEOs
manage their firms (Hambrick and Mason 1984, Jensen and Zajac 2004). The usefulness of executive
legal expertise is documented, although many studies have focused on the general counsel of the
company rather than lawyer CEOs. General counsel is shown to reduce profits from insider trading
(Jagolinzer, Larcker and Taylor 2011) and companies tend to give more accurate earnings forecasts
when general counsel is represented among the top executives as these companies are more likely to
issue bad news forecasts (Kwak, Ro and Suk 2012). In a similar manner, the presence of executives
with a background in law within an audit committee is shown to relate to better financial reporting
quality (Krishnan, Wen and Zhao 2011). Lawyer-directors are also argued to improve monitoring and
regulation management as well as improving the alignment of CEO and shareholder interest through
better structured compensation packages (Litov et al. 2014).
Recently the effect of a legal background has been expanded to study top management. Bagley
(2008) argues that legal astuteness6 in management teams may result in a competitive advantage
through reduced transaction costs (due to efficient use of formal contracts), stronger protection for
firm resources, option creation through legal tools and creating opportunities from regulatory
constraints. Legally astute management teams understand that interpreting and managing the legal
aspects of corporate decisions should not be delegated to the general counsel, but rather should be
6 Defined as “the ability of a top management team to communicate effectively with counsel and to work together to
solve complex problems” (Bagley 2008, 378).
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tackled by the business management who have better understanding of business objectives (Bagley
2008). The presence of a lawyer CEO may also affect the composition of the management team. Litov
et al. (2014) show that a presence of a lawyer CEO can predict the increase in presence of directors
with legal training, which may amplify the effect of the single lawyer executive.
Bamber et al. (2010) show that CEOs with a background in law give more conservative guidance
to financial markets reflecting risk-aversion towards litigation. Consistent with their findings,
Henderson et al. (2017) studied companies with CEOs who possessed a law degree and find that
lawyer CEOs are associated with lower frequency of litigation and less severe charges when litigated.
In  addition,  the  authors  show  that  companies  with  a  lawyer  CEO  tend  to  have  lower  capital
expenditure and R&D investment, which is often inversely related to CEO overconfidence (see e.g.,
Malmendier and Tate 2005, Huang and Kisgen 2013, Bernile et al. 2017). Henderson et al. (2017)
also document that lawyer CEOs associate with lower stock return volatility, a commonly used proxy
for managerial risk-taking (see e.g., Guay 1999, Chakraborty, Sheikh and Subramanian 2007). Their
paper is among the first to document lawyer risk-aversion, which has this far mostly been based on
anecdotal evidence. Finally, the authors show that lawyer CEOs are associated with higher firm value
when operating in litigation-prone industries and high-growth firms, which is explained by lower
earnings manipulation particularly in industries with a high litigation risk (Henderson et al. 2017).
Lawyers however also exhibit overconfident behaviour, contradicting the general perception of
risk-aversion. Litigators are overly optimistic on their odds of winning cases, even when presented
with statistics of similar litigations with lower success probabilities (Kahneman and Lovallo 1993).
Goodman-Delahunty et al. (2010) find similar results studying lawyers in general, showing that they
are overconfident in estimating their likelihood of success in case outcomes. Lawyers are also shown
to overestimate their ability in resisting pressure, both social and cognitive, when making judgements
(Langevoort and Rasmussen 1997), suggesting that the risk obsession of lawyers may be a by-product
of professional self-interest rather than personal risk preferences.
Conclusively, our understanding of how a background in law may affect corporate policies is
limited. On the other hand, corporate policies may be more cautious due to risk aversion. However,
the opposite may also be true if lawyers are better in navigating the risky territories due to better
understanding of potential legal consequences. My thesis contributes to the existing literature through
studying a range of corporate policies and how they are affected by the presence of a lawyer CEO.
19
3. Hypotheses
In this Chapter I present six distinguishable hypotheses that are empirically tested in the thesis.
Each hypothesis is developed based on existing academic literature, and broadly relates to the
perceived risk-aversion for lawyer CEOs.
Practicing law in the United States is regulated, and professionals pursuing a legal career have to
be accepted to the state’s bar association to be allowed to practice their profession. Furthermore, the
Juris Doctor (J. D.) programme, which is by far the most common education for a lawyer7, generally
follows the same structure across law schools in the country, which is natural as all law students
prepare for passing the bar. While there are areas of specialization within law school, the differences
between fields of specialisation are narrower than those within technical of business education, as the
J. D. programme only lasts for three years with the first year consisting mostly of mandatory (non-
elective) studies. Due to the abovementioned heterogeneity in the studies of lawyers, I expect to find
heterogeneity also in corporate policies executed by lawyer CEOs.
While not extensively studied in academia, lawyers are generally perceived as cautious and risk-
averse. Lawyers are hired to identify, manage and mitigate different business risks through contracts,
hedges and claims, and legal advisors are argued to have economic reasons to overstate these risks
(Bagley 2008). Business lawyers, the focus of this study, seldom have success fees related to their
compensation but are rather paid by the hour, especially when outside legal advice is used. This may
cause misaligned interests between lawyers and their clients, as identifying and overstating risks can
lead to more billable work through e.g. designing more specific and complex contracts to mitigate
these risks. Furthermore, Bagley (2008) notes that lawyers have a reputational or even financial
downside if they understate risks, as clients will likely not give them further business should they
significantly understate the presence of a risk that would later materialize. The potential misalignment
also affects in-house lawyers, who may receive more resources, entrenchment or a higher status
within the organization from overweighing risks (Bagley 2008). To add to the potentially misaligned
interests, the personality traits of lawyers are often described as cautious, thorough or risk-averse, and
business press articles related to for example the low innovativeness of lawyers due to their
conservativeness are common. Thus, it is no wonder that lawyers are characterised as the “nay-
sayers” and “gatekeepers” in corporate decision making (Langevoort and Rasmussen 1997).
In my thesis I study corporate risk-taking for companies with lawyer CEOs. Henderson et al.
(2017) are among the first to empirically document lawyer risk-aversion in a business setting by
7 96% of S&P 1500 lawyer CEOs have a J.D. degree in the study of Henderson et al. (2017).
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showing that companies with lawyer CEOs invest less in R&D and tangible assets and have lower
stock return volatility. Lawyer CEOs are also shown to associate positively with conservative
earnings guidance (Baber et al. 2010) and cautious earnings management particularly when the risk
of litigation is high (Henderson et al. 2017), both consistent with risk-averse policies. Henderson et
al. (2017) show that lawyer CEOs are associated with higher company value in industries where
litigation risk is large or legal guidance necessary, such as high-growth companies or the
pharmaceutical industry. In other types of companies, lawyer CEOs associate with lower firm value,
which the authors argue to be due to more conservative firm policies that negatively affect future cash
flows and growth. I expect to find conservativeness in the investment policy of firms with lawyer
CEOs in my sample, confirming the findings of Henderson et al. (2017). Following Bernile et al.
(2017), who show that a high level of natural disaster exposure leads to conservativeness implied by
company capital structure, I also examine the effect of a lawyer CEO on leverage and cash holdings.
I formulate my first and second hypothesis as:
H1: Companies with a lawyer CEO have lower capital expenditures and invest less in R&D than
companies with non-lawyer CEOs.
H2: Companies with a lawyer CEO have lower leverage ratios and higher cash-to-assets ratios
than the companies with non-lawyer CEOs.
I expect conservative policies to also reflect in the acquisitiveness of the company, a policy that
is shown to positively correlate with overconfidence in various studies (see e.g., Malmendier and Tate
2008, Huang and Kisgen 2013, Bernile et al. 2017). Lawyers may exhibit lower acquisitiveness due
to innate risk-aversion or better understanding of the risks, both of which would either increase their
discount rate or lower the expected cash flows from completing acquisitions and resulting in lower
NPVs for  potential  acquisitions  and  thus  a  smaller  pool  of  acceptable  acquisitions  with  a  positive
NPV. It is also possible that the risk-aversion towards litigation documented by Henderson et al.
(2017) would drive lower acquisitiveness, as the risk of litigation increases from large complex
transactions. Krishnan, Masulis, Thomas and Thompson (2012) document that approximately 10%
of announced acquisitions in the U.S. result in shareholder class action lawsuits, the most typical form
of litigation related to acquisitions. Acquisitions subject to these lawsuits are much less likely to be
completed than those that are not litigated (Krishnan et al. 2012). The authors show that shareholder
litigation is especially likely in large acquisitions, in situations when the acquirer already holds stock
of the target, and in acquisitions with relatively more cash financing. The risk of litigation may be
overweighed by litigation-conscious lawyer CEOs, resulting to lower acquisition appetite. Thus, I
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expect that lawyer-led companies should announce less large acquisitions8, and formulate my third
hypothesis as:
H3: Companies with a lawyer CEO are less likely to announce large acquisitions than companies
with non-lawyer CEOs.
In addition to acquisitiveness, I expect to find differences in acquisition outcomes. If lawyer
CEOs are less overconfident and thus have higher discount rates or project lower cash flows from
acquisitions, they should on average complete better acquisitions. Malmendier and Tate (2008) and
Huang and Kisgen (2013) show that overconfident CEOs are associated with lower announcement
day returns when they acquire companies, measured as the three-day [-1, +1] abnormal stock return
surrounding the acquisition announcement. Conservativeness is shown to associate with higher
announcement day returns (Benmelech and Frydman 2015), and anecdotal evidence supports the
categorization of lawyers towards conservativeness rather than overconfidence.
Legal expertise of the CEO may also prove to be an asset when undertaking acquisitions. Karsten,
Malmendier and Sautner (2017) show that legal advisors with better expertise obtain better
contractual  outcomes  for  their  clients  when  advising  them  in  acquisitions  than  advisors  with  less
experience. Lawyer CEOs are likely to have experience from negotiating acquisitions before
becoming CEOs as most executives with a law degree have practiced law at some point of their career
(Henderson et al. 2017). Following the argumentation of Bernile and Kang (2016) who show that
CEOs learn to negotiate takeovers through experience, lawyer CEOs may be better in negotiating
favourable contracts to their shareholders in acquisition situations.
The presence of a lawyer CEO is shown to positively correlate with the number of lawyers on
the board of directors (Litov et al. 2014, Henderson et al. 2017), suggesting that lawyer CEOs
associate with improved legal astuteness of the top management team and thus better oversight
(Bagley 2008). Legal astuteness of the management is argued to drive lower transaction costs through
more effective uses of contractual tools such as earn-outs, clauses or contingent claims (Bagley 2008).
Barney and Hansen (1994) argue that managers skilled in managing legal contracts with suppliers
have a competitive advantage compared to other managers who must utilize more costly governance
forces such as vertical integration or joint ventures. The same could be true for acquisitions, given
8 I define “large acquisitions” as those where the transaction value exceeds 5% of the market capitalization of the acquirer,
in line with previous literature studying CEOs and acquisitiveness such as Malmendier and Tate (2008), Huang and
Kisgen (2013) and Yim (2013).
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the  complexity  of  share  purchasing  and  shareholding  agreements,  as  well  as  the  size  of  potential
claims or penalties related to non-compliance of these contracts.
Finally, lawyers are shown to manage analyst and investor expectations more carefully than other
CEOs (Bamber et al. 2010, Henderson et al. 2017), which can lead to less surprises in terms of
acquisition announcements. As announcement day returns for large takeovers are typically negative
(see e.g. Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford 2001, Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz 2005), a smaller
surprise could translate to cumulative announcement returns closer to zero, i.e. a positive effect. I
formulate my fourth hypothesis as:
H4: Companies with a lawyer CEO exhibit higher announcement day returns for acquisitions
than companies with non-lawyer CEOs.
I  also study the types of acquisitions undertaken by lawyer CEOs. Consistent with the lower-
overconfidence hypothesis, I expect lawyer CEOs to engage in less unrelated acquisitions and less
cross-border acquisitions, both of which are related to higher risk (Bernile et al. 2017). I also look at
the way acquisitions are financed: using stock as the financing method for the acquisition reduces the
valuation risk of the target (Bernile et al. 2017), and thus I expect lawyer CEOs to be more likely to
finance acquisitions all-stock. Finally, I also expect lawyers to exhibit a higher completion rate for
their acquisitions due to better management of potential shareholder litigations that significantly
decrease the completion rate (Krishnan et al. 2012), a higher ability to anticipate outcomes from legal
due diligence, and a stronger understanding and negotiation of regulatory blocking of acquisitions. I
formulate my fifth hypothesis as:
H5: Companies with a lawyer CEO are less likely to announce unrelated or cross-border
acquisitions, more likely to finance their acquisition all-stock, and have a higher completion rate in
the acquisitions they announce.
Henderson et al. (2017) study litigation activity and conclude that lawyers are valuable as CEOs
in high-litigation-risk companies, which they document by studying the relation between lawyer
CEOs and the company’s Tobin’s q measure. In their study, lawyer CEOs are found to associate with
higher Tobin’s q values when companies are in high litigation risk industries9, in the pharmaceutical
industry, or are high-growth companies, and lower Tobin’s q measures otherwise. If my hypotheses
hold and lawyer CEOs associate with better acquisition outcomes (i.e. higher announcement day
returns), they could be valued more in highly acquisitive companies. Thus, I expect to find a positive
9 High litigation risk industries are defined as those in the top 10th percentile of litigation frequency (Henderson et al.
2017).
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relation with the Tobin’s q measure and lawyer CEOs for companies in the first quartile measured by
the number of announced acquisitions, which would further support the hypothesis that lawyers are
better acquirers than other CEOs. I formulate my sixth hypothesis as:
H6: Lawyer CEOs associate with higher Tobin’s q measures in acquisitive companies, and with
lower Tobin’s q measures for other companies.
4. Data and methods
This Chapter presents the data and empirical methods used in the thesis. I begin by describing the
data sources as well as summary statistics in Section 4.1 and present the primary empirical methods
in Section 4.2. The robustness and causality tests of the thesis are described in Section 4.3, and the
Chapter is finished by evaluating the potential limitations of the study in Section 4.4.
4.1 Data description
My sample comprises the CEOs of companies included in the S&P 1500 index during 1999-
2014, which is the longest period for which I have BoardEx data available. I include companies from
the time when they are included in the index, except for companies which appear multiple times
which I include from the first time they have been included in the index until the last time10. This way
all the companies in my sample are considered for consecutive years only. As is common practice for
research on mergers and acquisitions I exclude companies that operate in banking, insurance and
regulated utilities11. For the companies I collect balance sheet, income statement and cash flow items
from S&P Capital IQ’s Compustat database. The data retrieved from Compustat is complemented
with stock market data that is extracted from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP)
database. I retrieve data for acquisitions from Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum database. I exclude
transactions where the acquirer and target have the same ultimate parent, which are typically
repurchases, spin-offs or other restructurings and should thus not be mixed with acquisitions.
I collect executive data from two main sources. I start with a list of CEOs from the ExecuComp
database, from which I retrieve general CEO information such as name, age and tenure, as well as
data regarding the executives’ stock option holdings. Information on the CEOs education is collected
from BoardEx, from which data is available between 1999 and 2014. BoardEx covers 93.2% of CEOs
in my sample, and for the remaining 6.8% education data is collected from publicly available sources
such as Bloomberg, company websites and press announcements upon appointment. It should be
10 For example, if a company is included in the S&P 1500 from 2000 to 2004 and again from 2008 o 2010, I include it in
my sample for the whole time between 2000 and 2010.
11 The exclusion is done based on the 4 digit Standard Industry Classification (SIC) code: I exclude companies with the SIC code 4800
– 4999 and 6000 – 6999.
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noted that data availability biases my sample towards S&P 500 companies since education
information is more available for large company CEOs. I present the summary statistics in Table I
comparing non-lawyer CEOs to lawyer CEOs. All variables are defined in Appendix A, and their
correlations with each other are presented in Appendix B.
Table I: Summary statistics
 This table reports sample characteristics, observations are at the firm-year level in Panel A and Panel B, and at the transaction
level in Panel C. Panel A shows CEO personal characteristics, Panel B firm characteristics and Panel C acquisition characteristics.
Lawyer CEO is defined as a CEO with a law degree. All variables are defined in Appendix A. Firm characteristics are lagged by
one year. The correlation between variables in Panel A and Panel B are shown in Table XX in Appendix B. The statistical
significance of the t statistic of the mean difference between non-lawyer and lawyer CEOs observations is reported: *significant at
10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
Non-lawyer CEOs Lawyer CEOs Mean difference
Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Difference t-Test
Panel A: Personal characteristics (total of 2,522 unique CEOs, 13,370 firm-year observations)
Age 54.877 7.084 56.017 7.421 1.140 5.142***
Tenure 7.251 7.553 9.058 8.690 1.806 7.007***
Female 0.024 0.154 0.017 0.130 -0.007 -1.813*
MBA 0.402 0.490 0.078 0.268 -0.324 -36.641***
Panel B: Firm characteristics (total of 1,385 unique companies, 13,370 firm-year observations)
Total assets ($M) 8,482 32,037 7,107 14,181 -1,375 -2.756***
Total debt ($M) 2,389 16,243 1,793 3,582 -596 -3.321***
Market cap. ($M) 10,471 31,552 9,508 25,469 -963 -1.230
Total cap. ($M) 15,854 50,264 13,586 30,974 -2,268 -2.277**
Leverage 0.205 0.167 0.239 0.167 0.034 6.852***
Cash-to-assets 0.155 0.163 0.129 0.151 -0.025 -5.532***
ROA 0.051 0.122 0.058 0.083 0.007 2.674***
Tobin’s q 2.115 1.630 2.028 1.583 -0.087 -1.829*
CapEx 0.238 0.180 0.225 0.173 -0.013 -2.465**
R&D12 0.099 0.247 0.063 0.105 -0.036 -6.634***
Return 0.158 0.426 0.147 0.398 -0.010 -0.850
Volatility 0.112 0.063 0.105 0.057 -0.007 -3.808***
Cash flow 0.051 0.041 0.054 0.043 0.002 1.744*
P(large acquisition) 0.178 0.442 0.184 0.443 0.006 0.482
Firm age 31.319 20.679 34.870 21.457 3.551 5.534***
Panel C: Acquisition characteristics (total of 2,382 large acquisitions)
Relative deal value 0.251 0.347 0.299 0.376 0.048 1.832*
All stock acquisition 0.073 0.261 0.053 0.225 -0.020 -1.243
Unrelated acquisition 0.372 0.483 0.391 0.489 0.019 0.564
Hostile bid 0.013 0.115 0.013 0.115 -0.000 -0.014
Cross border acquisition 0.235 0.424 0.231 0.422 -0.003 -0.117
Private target 0.313 0.464 0.258 0.438 -0.055 -1.786*
Public target 0.309 0.462 0.351 0.478 0.042 1.254
Tender offer 0.101 0.301 0.102 0.304 0.001 0.054
Challenged bid 0.042 0.200 0.067 0.250 0.025 1.449
CAR 0.006 0.069 0.018 0.074 0.012 2.388**
Completed 0.929 0.258 0.916 0.279 -0.013 -0.673
Matching the data from Compustat, CRSP, SDC, ExecuComp and BoardEx from 1999-2014
yields 13,370 firm-year observations from 1,385 different companies. Of these firm-year
12 For R&D the total number of observations is 7 437 firm-years instead of 13 370 firm-years, as only observations where
R&D is above zero are included in the analysis.
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observations, 1,223 have lawyer CEOs while 12,147 are non-lawyer CEO observations. Panel A
shows executive characteristics of the 2,522 unique CEOs in my sample. I match each firm-year with
one CEO on the grounds of who held the title in the beginning of the calendar year and consider the
previous year the CEO transition year. I justify this methodology by the tendency that corporate
policies are typically long-term and new CEOs have only limited ability to immediately affect them,
thus the matching methodology accounts the CEO who has likely had the largest effect on the policy
with the corresponding firm-year-observation. Specifically, acquisitions tend to be long-term
projects, and thus even if the CEO is replaced before announcement (but held the position in the
beginning of the year), she is likely to be the one with the highest influence on the deal supporting
my choice of using calendar-year-beginning CEOs throughout my sample. If the company has had an
interim CEO or no CEO at all in the beginning of the year, I accept the next full-time manager of the
company as the CEO, however this only occurs in seldom instances.
Of the 2,522 CEOs in my sample, 219 or 8.7% have a law degree, consistent with Henderson et
al. (2017) who document that 9% of S&P 1500 CEOs have a law degree. BoardEx documents the
degree level as well as the qualification for each executive. In line with Henderson et al. (2017), I
accept undergraduate (LLB), graduate (LLM) and doctorate (J.D.) level law degrees for a CEO to be
categorized as a lawyer CEO, although it is noteworthy that the majority (over 80%) of lawyer CEOs
have a J.D. degree. I verify executives with the BoardEx qualification “Doctorate” from secondary
sources to be sure whether they hold a J.D. degree. The number of observations as well as the fraction
of lawyer CEOs is stable across sample years, as illustrated in Figure I. The highest fraction of lawyer
CEOs, 11.7%, is observed in 1999 while the lowest fraction, 7.8%, is from 2007. The size of the
sample is 800-900 observations from 2001 to 2014, while there are somewhat less observations from
1999 and 2000.
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Figure 1: Number of firm-year observations and fraction of lawyer CEOs over time
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Panel A also shows that approximately 37% of CEOs in my sample have an MBA degree, while
the rest have other degrees such as technical educations, MA degrees or no education information
available. Consistent with the findings of Huang and Kisgen (2013), approximately 2% of CEOs in
my sample are female. Lawyer CEOs are on average slightly older than non-lawyer CEOs and have
longer tenures as CEO. They are also less likely to be female, and significantly less likely to have a
MBA degree, which is not surprising as most of the CEOs only have one master level degree.
Panel B shows firm characteristics which are used both as dependent and independent variables
in the thesis. Firm age is computed as the difference between the calendar year and the firm’s first
observation in Compustat or CRSP, consistent with Yim (2013). It should be noted that for any tests
measuring R&D spending, only companies that report R&D figures, i.e. for which the number of
R&D investment is above zero, are included in the analysis. Conducting univariate differences in
means tests reveals several differences in firm characteristics for companies with lawyer CEOs
compared  to  their  peers  with  non-lawyer  CEOs.  Lawyers  are  more  likely  to  be  CEOs  in  smaller
companies in terms of book assets, debt or total capitalization. Lawyer CEOs also associate with
higher leverage ratios, lower cash-to-assets ratios, higher operating profitability and lower Tobin’s q
measures. Finally, as documented by Henderson et al. (2017), companies with lawyer CEOs seem to
invest less in tangible and intangible assets and have lower stock return volatility.
Panel  C  shows  acquisition  characteristics  of  the  2,382  acquisitions  in  my  sample  with  a
transaction level above 5% of the acquirer’s previous year-end market capitalization. Univariate tests
in mean differences suggest that lawyers are more likely to announce larger acquisitions, less likely
to acquire private targets, and have higher announcement day returns for the acquisition
announcements. There are no significant differences in other acquisition characteristics. When
interpreting these differences, however, it should be noted that they do not include any control
variables and thus only offer preliminary guidance for underlying correlations. The results for the
more sophisticated regressions including control variables are shown in Chapter Five.
Table II presents the division of lawyer CEOs across industries. I define industries by the 2-digit
NAICS code and further divide manufacturing to three sub-industries from the standard classification
to have observations more evenly split out, resulting in 14 different industries of which one is a pooled
industry for all other industries. Lawyer CEOs are present in each industry, with the lowest percentage
in the information industry and largest in the construction industry. It should, however, be noted that
manufacturing is by far the largest industry measured by the number of companies as well as the
number of lawyer CEOs.
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Table II: Firm industries
 This table reports the number and fraction of lawyer CEOs in each 2-digit-NAICS industry. Observations are at the firm-year
level. Lawyer CEO is a binary variable which equals one if the CEO of the company has a law degree.
Industry 2-digit NAICS Lawyer CEOs Total observations Lawyer CEOs as
% of total
Mining 21 113 744 15.2%
Construction 23 83 286 29.0%
Manufacturing 1 31 87 881 9.9%
Manufacturing 2 32 200 1,951 10.3%
Manufacturing 3 33 320 4,580 7.0%
Wholesale 42 43 547 7.9%
Retail 44-45 62 1,000 6.2%
Transport 48-49 59 462 12.8%
Information 51 54 960 5.6%
Scientific 54 43 633 6.8%
Administrative 56 49 351 14.0%
Healthcare 62 33 249 13.3%
Accommodation 72 49 358 13.7%
Other - 28 368 7.6%
4.2 Empirical methods
I examine the relation between Lawyer CEO and investments in capital expenditures and R&D
as well as leverage and cash-to-assets ratios by using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions
following Bernile et al. (2017) and Henderson et al. (2017). For studying the investment policies of
the company, I regress the capital expenditure to net tangible assets (CapEx) of a company i during
year t with the CEO j:
	ܥܽ݌ܧݔ௜௝௧ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵܮܽݓݕ݁ݎ	ܥܧ ௝ܱ + ௜ܺ௝௧ିଵߜ + ߳௜௝௧
where Lawyer CEO is a binary variable with a value 1 if the company’s CEO has a law degree
and 0 otherwise. X୧୨୲ିଵδ is a matrix including a defined set of control variables that are lagged by one
year and ϵ୧୨୲ are the errors that are assumed to be independent between firms. The same regression is
conducted for the investment in intangible assets (R&D). In addition to studying investment policy,
I conduct similar regressions for debt in current liabilities plus long-term book debt to total assets
(Leverage) and cash and marketable securities to book assets (Cash-to-assets). Throughout the thesis
I report the results of two-tailed t-tests although the risk-aversion hypothesis would suggest one-tailed
hypothesis tests (see e.g. Malmendier and Tate 2008), and thus results reported at the 10%
significance level can be interpreted as significant at the 5% level for one-sided tests.
For studying acquisitiveness of companies with a lawyer CEO, I follow Malmendier and Tate
(2008) and Yim (2013) and estimate logit regressions of the probability of a company i to announce
an acquisition exceeding 5% of the previous year-end market capitalization of the acquirer during
year t with the CEO j:
(1)
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ܲݎ݋ܾ(݈ܽݎ݃݁	ܽܿݍݑ݅ݏ݅ݐ݅݋݊௜௝௧) = ܨ(ߚ଴ + ߚଵܮܽݓݕ݁ݎ	ܥܧ ௝ܱ + ௜ܺ௝௧ିଵߜ + ߳௜௝௧)
where F(z)=1/(1+e-z). Lawyer CEO is a binary variable with a value 1 if the company’s CEO has
a law degree and 0 otherwise. ௜ܺ௝௧ିଵߜ is a matrix including a defined set of control variables that are
lagged by one year and ߳௜௝௧  are the errors that are assumed to be independent between firms.
For studying announcement day returns, I conduct OLS regressions on the cumulative abnormal
stock return (CAR) during the three-day period [-1, +1] surrounding the announcement following
Malmendier and Tate (2008) and Yim (2013). As all companies in my sample are included in the
S&P 1500, I subtract the daily return of the S&P 1500 index from the daily return of the company
making the acquisition to calculate the abnormal return. The observations are at the transaction level,
and only include large acquisitions. I regress the CAR of a transaction k announced by a company i
during year t with the CEO j:
ܥܣܴ௞௜௝௧ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵܮܽݓݕ݁ݎ	ܥܧ ௝ܱ + ܺ௞௜௝௧ିଵߜ + ߳௞௜௝௧
where Lawyer CEO is a binary variable with a value 1 if the company’s CEO has a law degree
and 0 otherwise. ܺ௞௜௝௧ିଵߜ is a matrix including a defined set of control variables that are, if applicable
(i.e. if they are not related to the acquisition) lagged by one year, and ߳௞௜௝௧  are the errors that are
assumed to be independent between transactions.
4.3 Robustness and causality tests
While panel regressions with lawyer CEOs as a binary variable is the main methodology for
studying the relationship between lawyer CEOs and corporate policies, I use additional tests for the
sake of robustness as well as to make the study comparable with other existing research. To evaluate
causality, I replicate my tests for investment policies, capital structure and acquisitiveness using the
difference-in-differences framework in line with for example Huang and Kisgen (2013). Specifically,
the difference-in-differences regression is estimated by regressing the variable of interest, for example
large acquisitions, of company i with CEO j at a time t:
ܮܽݎ݃݁	ܽܿݍݑ݅ݏ݅ݐ݅݋݊ݏ௜௝௧ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵܲ݋ݏݐ௜௝௧ + ߚଵܮܽݓݕ݁ݎ௝ × ܲ݋ݏݐ௜௝௧ + ௜ܺ௝௧ିଵߜ + ߳௜௝௧
where Lawyer is a binary variable for whether a company is a non-lawyer-to-lawyer CEO
transition company and ܲ݋ݏݐ௜௝௧ is a binary variable for whether year t is after the transition of non-
lawyer CEO to lawyer CEO. ௜ܺ௝௧ିଵߜ is a matrix including a defined set of control variables that are
lagged by one year and ߳௜௝௧  are the errors that are assumed to be independent between firms. I include
three years before the transition and three years after the transition in the sample, excluding the
(2)
(3)
(4)
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transition year. I require a company to have data for two years before the transition year to be included
in the sample.
The difference-in-differences methodology compares corporate policies within a company
before and after a CEO replacement, i.e. before a lawyer CEO is selected and afterwards. All non-
lawyer to non-lawyer transitions are used as the control group, and non-lawyer to lawyer transitions
as  the  treatment  group,  mitigating  effects  of  a  CEO transition  in  general  as  well  as  time-invariant
company specific effects. The difference-in-differences methodology allows controlling for firm
fixed effects and mitigate issues from selection bias i.e. if lawyer CEOs self-select to companies that
are already executing policies consistent with their management style. Instead, the methodology
documents  the  possible  shift  in  managerial  policies  after  a  lawyer  CEO  is  hired.  While  the
methodology has clear upsides, it is used as a robustness test rather than the main methodology
because using it significantly decreases sample size as it requires an executive change to take place,
and the CEO to be in power for a sufficient number of years before and after the replacement.
For announcement day returns, I will not use the difference-in-differences approach as the sample
size will become too small for meaningful analysis. Instead, I use a sub-sample approach to check for
robustness, conducting the same OLS regressions as previously to a restricted sample. In addition, I
verify the results using different time intervals in addition to the three-day [-1, +1] interval. I also
study long-term abnormal returns after the acquisition to evaluate the quality of the acquisitions from
a long-term perspective, however it should be noted that these tests are preliminary and highly
indicative due to the exclusion of control variables and the difficulty of isolating the effect
acquisitions have on stock returns.
To test the risk-aversion hypothesis of lawyer CEOs, I follow Malmendier and Tate (2005) and
establish three overconfidence measures related to stock option behaviour of the CEOs that should
have a negative correlation with lawyers if they indeed are risk-averse. Stock grants are a common
way to compensate CEOs and align their interests with the shareholders of publicly listed companies.
However,  CEOs  have  their  human  capital  already  invested  in  the  company,  receive  most  of  their
salary from the company, and are unable to hedge their risk towards negative movements in the stock
price through short selling the stock. This causes CEOs to be over-invested in the companies they
work in, and over-exposed to their idiosyncratic risks. At the same time, some of the risks related to
for example the industry cannot be affected by the CEO, further increasing potential downside. In
worst  case  scenarios,  CEOs  may  be  replaced  due  to  low  performance  of  stock,  which  would
simultaneously significantly decrease their salary as well as the value of their options and company
stock. Due to this under-diversification, risk-averse CEOs should avoid holding vested in-the-money
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options or sellable shares in the company, and rather cash their options when the stock price is
sufficiently high (Malmendier and Tate 2005).
To be specific, Malmendier and Tate (2005) define three measures of overconfidence that I
replicate in my thesis. A Holder 67 is a CEO who has twice over the sample period held exercisable
options that are over 67% in-the-money, which corresponds to a Constant Relative Risk-Aversion
(CRRA) measure of three (Malmendier and Tate 2005). A Longholder is a CEO who over the sample
period has held options until the last year of their duration. Options are fully vested typically in five
years and are on average over 200% in-the-money during their final year (Malmendier and Tate
2005), and thus executives who decide to hold on to their options until their year of expiration should
likely have exercised them already would they not be overconfident. Finally, a Net buyer is a CEO
who over the sample period has more years of net stock increase than decrease, i.e. buys stock more
often than sells (Malmendier and Tate 2005). Following Huang and Kisgen (2013), I include a fourth
measure of overconfidence accounting for career outcomes. If lawyer CEOs are less overconfident,
they should on average have better career outcomes due to a lower amount of shareholder-wealth-
destroying policies. I measure the likelihood of being replaced within the first 4 years of the
executive’s tenure, which should be larger for non-lawyers were they less overconfident.
As  ExecuComp only  reports  option  data  on  an  aggregate  level,  some simplifications  must  be
made to the measures. The moneyness for Holder 67 tests is calculated by dividing the estimated
value of in-the-money unexercised exercisable options by the number of unexercised exercisable
options to receive the realizable value per option, which is compared to the end-year price of the stock
to obtain the average strike price. The Longholder tests requires the expiration date of the option
which is only available from 2006 to 2014, and thus the Longholder test has a smaller sample of
CEOs than the other overconfidence tests. For the Net buyer test, I compare the number of stock at
the end of the previous year to that at the end of the current year to determine whether a CEO has
bought more stock than sold, which means that I do not account for stock grants or the exercise of
options. Thus, the likelihood of a CEO being a Net buyer is higher than of being a Holder 67 or a
Longholder, consistent with Malmendier and Tate (2005).
4.4 Limitations of the study
There  are  several  potential  limitations  to  my  study.  As  is  common  for  most  CEO  studies,
conclusively determining causality is not feasible with the methodology of this study. Rather, the
results show correlations that suggest potential causality, which is further evaluated through
robustness tests. The main methodology is unable to control for firm fixed effects, and while this is
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mitigated by controlling for industries, it is possible that results are due to lawyer CEOs present in
certain types of companies within industries. Furthermore, CEOs are not randomly assigned to
companies, leading to endogeneity concerns in CEO-firm matching. Observed results may be driven
by self-selection of CEOs looking to utilize certain policies, or selection by boards who wish to see
certain policies executed in the company. As argued by Malmendier and Tate (2005), observable
CEO characteristics such as gender, age or employment background may be selection criteria for the
board and thus drive results. Finally, it is also possible that unobserved variables correlating both with
dependent variables and lawyers, rather than the lawyer-effect per se, are driving results. I address
these matters of endogeneity by including a large set of control variables consistent with previous
literature, and through additional tests of robustness. Furthermore, endogeneity limitations do not
cause systematic bias or errors in the results but are rather aspects to keep in mind when making
interpretations. Even if lawyers are chosen as CEOs specifically due to their background, boards
should be aware of the different corporate policies that may be affected.
Another methodology-related limitation is the potential multicollinearity, i.e. strong correlation
between two explanatory variables, which decreases the reliability of interpretations for one variable.
If a CEOs law degree is highly correlated with control variables their individual effect might be
biased. I present the correlations for lawyer CEO and control variables in Table XX in Appendix B.
All correlations between the lawyer CEO variable and other CEO and firm control variables are
between the interval -0.1 and 0.1 except for MBA CEO, which has a negative correlation of -0.19,
suggesting no significant bias caused by multicollinearity in the regressions. Some control variables
such as age and tenure are highly correlated with each other, decreasing the reliability of these effects
individually. The effects of highly correlated variables should not be interpreted individually but
together. However, as these variables are only used as controls they do not present complications
towards the analysis.
A concern regarding the sample is survival bias. Although the timespan for the analysis is 16
years, all companies are not present throughout the timespan due to dropping out from the S&P 1500
index due to e.g. merging with another company, losing market capitalization or bankruptcy. As the
index is based on the market capitalisation of the company, firms experiencing a large decline in their
share price are at risk of being omitted from the sample whereas firms with an increase in share price
are more likely to be included. As share price valuation is shown to affect acquisitiveness (Schleifer
and Vishny 2003) and announcement day returns (Wang 2018), this could lead to bias in the average
acquisitiveness or announcement day returns. However, as we are not interested in the actual number
of acquisitions per se but rather on the difference in acquisitiveness between lawyer CEOs and their
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peers, this is not a problem to the analysis. Furthermore, as seen from Appendix B, lawyer CEO does
not significantly correlate with prior year returns, suggesting that no systematic error should be
present due to the sampling logic.
Finally, there are data-driven limitations to be considered when interpreting the results of this
study. The largest limitation is the availability of transaction value for acquisitions in the SDC
Platinum database, which significantly lowers the amount of acquisitions accepted to the sample. This
may also cause bias in the sample if for example lawyer CEOs are less willing to announce transaction
values, resulting in less acquisitions in the sample for companies with lawyer CEOs. This issue is
mitigated by sample selection as all companies are publicly listed and thus subject to certain
transparency and disclosure regulations that should decrease their ability to decide whether to
announce the transaction value. Furthermore, acquisitions without transaction value are likely to be
small and thus insignificant as we are interested in large acquisitions.
Another potential issue is reliance on multiple sources of data for the CEOs education
background. My sample is weighed towards large companies as for S&P 500 CEOs I hand-collect
CEO data from public sources if it is not included in BoardEx. However, for S&P 400 and S&P 600
CEOs, I hand-collect the data only in situations where the exclusion of the company would lead to an
interrupted sequence of firm-years and exclude the firm-years from the sample otherwise13. The
choice of this sampling policy is to keep the sample as large as possible, while accepting the constraint
that if all missing information had to be hand-collected it would be extremely time-consuming. It will
likely over-present the number of lawyers in the sample since that a J. D. degree is probably more
likely to be in BoardEx than a less known degree, and since the sampling decision excludes S&P 400
and S&P 600 CEOs without any education information. However, the potential over-representation
seems mild as my share of lawyer CEOs is the same as in Henderson et al. (2017). Furthermore, there
should be no correlation between dependent variables and companies omitted due to the sampling
logic, and thus it should not significantly affect the interpretation of the results.
One variable that may drive results but is omitted from the control variables is the CEOs
compensation structure. It is possible that boards decide on different incentive structures for lawyers
to tackle for example potential risk-aversion, or that lawyers negotiate different kinds of incentive
packages due to their legal background. Yim (2013) shows that incentives towards acquisitions for
younger CEOs are different than those of older CEOs and argues that this is one of the main reasons
13 For example, consider a company with CEO A from 1999-2004, CEO B from 2005-2009, and CEO C from 2010-2014.
If only CEO A and CEO C have education data available, I hand-collect data for CEO B to maintain an uninterrupted
sample. However, if CEO C would be the one with missing education data, I exclude years 2010-2014 from the sample.
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why younger CEOs tend to announce more acquisitions which also tend to be more value-destroying
on average. However, consistent with most CEO studies, I exclude incentive structures from the
control variables of this study, which is largely due to data limitations for building incentive variables
that could explain the dependent variables.
There are also limitations to the firm specific control variables I collect for the analysis. The
largest complication is caused by the difference in company specific reporting years and calendar
years. The firm specific accounting variables are taken from the latest full-year report at the beginning
of each calendar year, and they are used as a control variable in explaining the dependant variables
in the following year. This will cause a lagged effect of accounting variables for companies that have
a different reporting year than the calendar year. There is also a potential for a systematic error in this
practice as firms in certain industries tend to follow similar reporting standards: the accounting
variables for some industries might be more lagged on average than for others. However, as the
control variables are not the focus of the study, and as lawyer CEOs are relatively evenly split across
industries as shown in Table II, this potential error is acceptable. The differences occurring from
industries should also be captured in the Industry * Year control variable, further mitigating the issue
from lagged accounting controls.
Finally, the results reflect only large publicly listed U.S. companies and their generalisation for
other countries, for smaller companies and for companies with a different ownership structure are
debatable. However, as my paper is among the first to document how lawyer CEOs relate to corporate
policies, studying these effects in different markets is an attractive area of potential further research.
5. Empirical results
This Chapter presents the empirical results from OLS and logistic regressions. In Section 5.1 I
present results from investment and capital structure regressions, evaluating Hypotheses One and
Two. Section 5.2 presents results on acquisitiveness evaluating Hypothesis Three, while Section 5.3
presents the results of acquisition outcomes and characteristics evaluating Hypotheses Four and Five.
Section 5.4 presents the results of firm value evaluating Hypothesis Six.
5.1 Investments and capital structure
I begin the analysis by running OLS regressions on investment policies in both tangible (CapEx)
and intangible (R&D) assets with Lawyer CEO as an independent variable with the value 1 if the
CEO has a law degree and 0 otherwise. The results are presented in Table III.
Column 1 shows that in univariate regressions, i.e. when only one independent variable is used to
explain CapEx, Lawyer CEO has  a  statistically  significant  negative  effect.  The  effect  remains
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negative and significant after including both CEO specific control variables in Column 2 and firm-
specific control variables in Column 3. In Column 3 I also include Industry * Year control variables
to control for the time-variance of capital expenditures, as well as the industry dependence. Columns
4-6 present the results of panel OLS regressions with R&D expenditure to sales as the dependent
variable. The Lawyer CEO effect towards R&D is shown to be negative and statistically significant
at the 1% level after including both CEO, firm-specific and Industry * Year control variables.
Table III: Investment policies, OLS regressions
This table shows the results of OLS regressions where the dependent variable is capital expenditure to net tangible assets in
Columns 1-3 and R&D expenditure to total sales in Columns 4-6. The observations are on the firm-year level. Lawyer CEO is a
binary variable that equals one if the company has a CEO with a law degree. All control variables are defined in Appendix A and
firm control variables are lagged by one year. Standard errors are presented in parentheses and are adjusted for potential
heteroscedasticity. The statistical significance of the coefficients is reported: *significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, ***
significant at 1%.
CapEx R&D
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lawyer CEO -0.012**
(0.005)
-0.014***
(0.005)
-0.010**
(0.004)
-0.036***
(0.004)
-0.036***
(0.005)
-0.024***
(0.005)
MBA CEO -0.008***
(0.005)
-0.003
(0.002)
-0.015***
(0.005)
-0.004
(0.005)
Age -0.004***
(0.000)
-0.002***
(0.000)
-0.005***
(0.000)
-0.003***
(0.000)
Tenure 0.002***
(0.002)
0.001***
(0.000)
0.004***
(0.000)
0.003***
(0.000)
Female -0.010
(0.007)
-0.004
(0.006)
-0.023***
(0.008)
-0.013*
(0.007)
Log TA -0.008***
(0.001)
-0.008***
(0.003)
ROA 0.016
(0.019)
-0.325***
(0.090)
Tobin’s q 0.019***
(0.003)
0.018***
(0.006)
Leverage -0.094***
(0.010)
-0.062*
(0.037)
Return 0.016***
(0.004)
-0.026**
(0.012)
Volatility 0.127***
(0.026)
0.628***
(0.153)
Fixed effects No No Industry * Year No No Industry * Year
Observations 13,370 13,370 13,370 7,459 7,459 7,459
Adjusted R2 0.000 0.036 0.290 0.002 0.026 0.164
The effects of control variables are in line with previous literature (see e.g., Bertrand and Schoar
2003, Henderson et al. 2017). Age has a negative effect on CapEx as older CEOs tend to follow more
conservative policies. Higher valuation, suggested by Tobin’s q and previous year return, also seem
to drive investments as funds are more likely to be available, while leverage has a significant negative
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effect. The negative effect of firm size, measured by Log TA, is likely driven by the mechanic
inversion of the dependent variables14. For R&D, ROA, stock return, and leverage all have significant
negative  effects,  while  Tobin’s  q  and  volatility  have  a  positive  effect,  consistent  with  previous
literature (see e.g., Hirshleifer et al. 2012, Henderson et al. 2017).
The negative effect of Lawyer CEO on both CapEx and R&D confirm the findings of Henderson
et al. (2017), which is not surprising as my sample is very similar to theirs15. Both effects, especially
the R&D effect, are economically significant: -0.010 corresponds to 4.4% less capital expenditure,
while -0.024 corresponds to 25.3% lower R&D expense. Thus, Hypothesis One is strongly supported
by the empirical results. The magnitudes are consistent with Henderson et al. (2017) who report 6.3%
and 46.6% lower investments respectively. The difference in the magnitude of the Lawyer CEO R&D
effect is likely driven by sampling methodology. I exclude all companies with zero R&D investment,
interpreting it as not reporting R&D as opposed to the interpretation that no R&D investments are
made. This methodology yields approximately 44% less observations for the R&D regressions, while
Henderson et al. (2017) have slightly more observations for the R&D test than CapEx regressions.
I continue to study the Lawyer CEO effect on capital structure. Table IV presents the results of
leverage and cash-to-assets as dependent variables. I report the results of univariate regressions in
Columns 1 and 4 and continue to add CEO specific characteristics in Columns 2 and 5, and firm,
industry and year control variables in Columns 3 and 6. The standard set of firm control variables
include Log TA, ROA, Tobin’s q, asset tangibility, sales growth and a dividend paying indicator with
value 1 if the company pays dividends and 0 otherwise, consistent with Bernile et al. (2017). Contrary
to Hypothesis Two, Lawyer CEO has a positive association with Leverage and a negative effect to
Cash-to-assets, which suggest aggressive corporate policies instead of risk-aversion. The effects
remain statistically significant after the inclusion of control variables.
The control variable effects are in line with previous literature. Consistent with Huang and
Kisgen (2013), companies with female CEOs have lower leverage. ROA and Tobin’s q also drive
lower leverage, as documented also by Huang and Kisgen (2013) and Bernile et al. (2017). Higher
assets, asset tangibility, dividends and sales growth drive lower cash-to-assets ratios as documented
in Bernile et al. (2017) which is likely due to higher capital expenditure requirements. Tobin’s q on
the contrary seems to associate with higher cash holdings, in line with Bernile et al. (2017) but
14 The dependent variable is CapEx/PP&E, and PP&E is included in total assets. Companies with higher total assets are
likely to have higher PP&E and would thus require a higher cash investment to CapEx, which may drive the negative
effect as investment opportunities may be limited.
15 Henderson et al. (2017) have a slightly larger sample, covering S&P 1500 companies for the time period 1992 to 2012
while my sample covers S&P 1500 companies from 1999 to 2014.
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somewhat contradicting to the general understanding that excess cash should be paid out to
shareholders to maximize firm value.
Table IV: Leverage and cash-to-assets, OLS regressions
This table shows the results of OLS regressions where the dependent variable is the debt in current book liabilities plus long-term
book debt to total assets ratio of the company in Columns 1-3 and the cash and marketable securities to total asset ratio of the
company  in  Columns  4-6.  The  observations  are  on  the  firm-year  level.  Lawyer  CEO is  a  binary  variable  that  equals  one  if  the
company has a CEO with a law degree. All control variables are defined in Appendix A and firm control variables are lagged by
one year. Standard errors are presented in parentheses and are adjusted for potential heteroscedasticity. The statistical significance
of the coefficients is reported: *significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
Leverage Cash-to-assets
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lawyer CEO 0.038***(0.005)
0.042***
(0.005)
0.024***
(0.005)
-0.023***
(0.005)
-0.028***
(0.005)
-0.009**
(0.004)
MBA CEO -0.014(0.009)
-0.023***
(0.008)
0.003
(0.007)
0.003
(0.006)
Age 0.010***(0.003)
0.004
(0.003)
-0.010***
(0.003)
-0.008***
(0.002)
Tenure 0.002***(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.004***
(0.000)
-0.002***
(0.000)
Female -0.002***(0.000)
-0.000**
(0.000)
0.004***
(0.000)
0.002***
(0.000)
Log TA 0.027***(0.001)
-0.016***
(0.001)
ROA -0.138***(0.037)
-0.074***
(0.021)
Tobin’s q -0.011***(0.002)
0.026***
(0.004)
Asset
tangibility
0.100***
(0.009)
-0.234***
(0.009)
Sales growth 0.011(0.007)
-0.019***
(0.007)
Dividend
paying
0.010***
(0.003)
-0.052***
(0.003)
Fixed effects No No Industry * Year No No Industry * Year
Observations 13,370 13,370 13,370 13,370 13,370 13,370
Adjusted R2 0.004 0.014 0.210 0.002 0.040 0.359
The findings are contradictory to general risk-aversion in lawyer CEOs, which would suggest
similar  effects  as  for  extreme-fatality  CEOs in  the  study  of  Bernile  et  al.  (2017).  The  evidence  in
Columns 3 and 6 suggest that lawyer CEOs associate with 2.4 percentage points higher leverage ratios
and 0.9 percentage points lower cash-to-assets ratios. While both effects decrease in magnitude
through the inclusion of control variables, they remain statistically significant and thus provide no
support for Hypothesis Two. The findings may, however, be in line with efficient management of the
company, which is discussed in more detail in Chapter Seven.
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5.2 Acquisitiveness
Acquisitiveness is shown to be affected by CEO characteristics such as age (Yim 2013), gender
(Huang and Kisgen 2013), overconfidence and risk-tolerance (Malmendier and Tate 2008, Graham
et al. 2013), and more specific factors such as natural disaster exposure (Bernile et al. 2017). I study
the relation between Lawyer CEO and the probability of announcing an acquisition with a transaction
value exceeding 5% of the acquirer’s previous year market capitalization. I run logistic regressions
and present the results in Columns 1-3 of Table V. The coefficients are presented as odds ratios,
which are interpreted as the factor by which the independent variable affects the dependent variable.
Table V: Acquisitiveness, logistic regressions
This table shows the results of logistic regressions (Columns 1-3) where the dependent variable is a binary variable that equals
one if the company announces one or more acquisitions with a transaction value above 5% of the acquirer’s market capitalization,
and of OLS regressions (Columns 4-6) where the dependent variable is the number of announced large acquisitions. Coefficients in
Columns 1-3 are reported as odds ratios. The observations are on the firm-year level. Lawyer CEO is a binary variable that equals
one if the company has a CEO with a law degree. All control variables are defined in Appendix A and firm control variables are
lagged by one year. Standard errors are presented in parentheses and are adjusted for potential heteroscedasticity. The statistical
significance of the coefficients is reported: *significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
Logistic regressions
Pr(large acquisition)
OLS regressions
N(large acquisition)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lawyer CEO 1.037
(0.085)
1.070
(0.089)
1.073
(0.092)
0.006
(0.013)
0.010
(0.013)
0.009
(0.013)
MBA CEO 1.022
(0.051)
0.996
(0.052)
0.002
(0.008)
-0.003
(0.008)
Age 0.995
(0.004)
0.995
(0.004)
-0.000
(0.001)
-0.000
(0.001)
Tenure 0.988***
(0.004)
0.987***
(0.004)
-0.002***
(0.001)
-0.002***
(0.001)
Female 0.724*
(0.124)
0.817
(0.145)
-0.059***
(0.020)
-0.037*
(0.020)
Log TA 0.958**
(0.019)
-0.007**
(0.003)
Tobin’s q 0.862***
(0.027)
-0.018***
(0.004)
Return 1.465***
(0.102)
0.054***
(0.011)
Cash flow 63.701***
(46.359)
0.605***
(0.099)
Firm age 0.996***
(0.001)
-0.001**
(0.000)
Fixed effects No No Industry * Year No No Industry * Year
Observations 13,370 13,370 13,050 13,370 13,370 13,370
Pseudo R2 0.000 0.02 0.047
Adjusted R2 0.000 0.002 0.045
I show the results of univariate regressions in Column 1 and I include control variables related to
CEO and company characteristics in Columns 2 and 3. I find no statistically significant effects for
Lawyer CEO.  Mergers  are  shown  to  occur  in  year-specific  waves  and  cluster  strongly  within
38
industries (Andrade et al. 2001) and thus I include Industry * Year fixed effects. As age and tenure
are both reported in years and are highly correlated with each other, their effect should be studied
together. Consistent with Yim (2013), older CEOs (who also tend to have higher tenures) are
associated  with  a  factor  below 1  which  is  statistically  significant  at  the  1% level.  Consistent  with
Huang and Kisgen (2013), female CEOs are less likely to announce large acquisitions, although this
effect is no more statistically significant after firm control variables are included in Column 3. In line
with traditional corporate finance literature, previous year returns and cash flow associate positively
with acquisitiveness, as acquisitiveness is shown to be driven by internally generated cash as well as
company valuation (Jensen 1986, Schleifer and Vishny 2003, Savor and Lu 2009).
A limitation to logistic regressions is that it does not account for serial acquirers i.e. companies
that announce more than one acquisition per year. While this is seldom as the 5% market
capitalization threshold is high, there are a total of 238 firm-year observations with more than one
large  acquisition.  To  account  for  these  observations,  I  run  OLS  regressions  with  the  dependent
variable as the number of acquisitions and report the results in Columns 4-6. The effects are in line
with the observations in Columns 1-3, and now the negative coefficient for female CEOs remains
significant at the 10% level after the inclusion of firm, industry and year control variables.
Hypothesis Four, i.e. that lawyer CEOs associate with less acquisitions than their non-lawyer
peers, is not supported by the findings. In fact, the effect for lawyers seems to be positive through all
regressions, although it is not statistically significant16.  With  the  control  variables  in  line  with
previous  literature,  I  conclude  that  lawyer  CEOs do  not  significantly  differ  from their  non-lawyer
peers in terms of acquisitiveness.
5.3 Acquisition outcomes and characteristics
The most studied acquisition outcome is the market’s reaction to the acquisition announcement.
According to the efficient market hypothesis, existing information is reflected in the stock price of a
company and thus the most relevant period to assess the value of an acquisition is looking at the time
when new information is published, i.e. immediately upon the announcement of an acquisition. A
common way to study the value of acquisitions is measuring the cumulative abnormal return (CAR)
of the acquiring company’s stock around the acquisition announcement, typically one day before and
one day after the announcement day [-1, +1]. The methodology assumes that some market participants
16 In unreported regressions, I relax the market capitalization requirement for large acquisitions to 2.5% and find similar
results: slightly positive, but not statistically significant effects for lawyer CEOs. The same is true when I test for very
large acquisitions that exceed 10% of acquirer market capitalization.
39
may anticipate the announcement while others may react slightly late, and thus the relevant time
interval is three days.
I run OLS regressions with CAR as the dependent variable and Lawyer CEO, among other CEO,
firm, industry, year and acquisition specific control variables as independent variables. I consider
only large acquisitions as smaller ones would likely not receive a significant market reaction and
would thus introduce noise to the analysis. The sample is 2,382 acquisitions which are completed by
909 companies (66% of the original sample) and 1,213 CEOs (54% of the original sample) of which
approximately 9% are lawyers. The results are presented in Table VI.
I present univariate regressions in Column 1 and find that Lawyer CEO has a significant positive
association with announcement day returns. The effect and its statistical significance increases after
the inclusion of other CEO control variables in Column 2, firm, industry and year control variables
in Column 3 as well as deal specific control variables in Column 4. As opposed to previous
regressions, I include industry and year fixed effects separately to have a sufficient amount of
observations in each category. Firm size has a large negative effect on announcement day returns in
line with previous literature (see e.g., Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz 2004, Yim 2013) while
unrelated acquisitions as well as acquisitions pursuing publicly listed target companies have a
significant negative effect. Furthermore, previous year returns associate positively with CAR, which
could be explained by companies using overvalued stock to pay for the acquisitions in line with
Schleifer and Vishny (2003) and Pavel and Lu (2009).
As shown in Column 4, Lawyer CEO associates with 1.4 percentage points higher cumulative
abnormal returns surrounding the announcement than the baseline. As the average CAR for the
acquisitions in my sample is 0.7%, this result has large economic significance. For example, the
positive effect associated with Lawyer CEO is  larger  than  the  negative  effect  associated  with
unrelated acquisitions, a commonly accepted proxy for risky and on average value-destroying
acquisitions (see e.g., Bernile et al. 2017). Hypothesis Four is thus strongly supported by empirical
evidence. In addition to high litigation-risk and high growth industries (see Henderson et al. 2017),
lawyers seem to add value also in acquisitions, which may be explained by the fact that acquisitions
often lead to litigation e.g. to shareholder class action lawsuits, and even when they do not, significant
legal risk and complexity is associated to them.
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Table VI: Announcement returns, OLS regressions
This table shows the results of OLS regressions where the dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return in percentage
points three days surrounding the announcement day [-1 +1]. The observations are on the transaction level and only include large
acquisitions. Lawyer CEO is a binary variable that equals one if the company has a CEO with a law degree. All control variables
are defined in Appendix A and firm control variables are lagged by one year. Standard errors are presented in parentheses and are
adjusted for potential heteroscedasticity. The statistical significance of the coefficients is reported: *significant at 10%, ** significant
at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
Cumulative abnormal return (CAR) [-1, +1]
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lawyer CEO 0.012**
(0.005)
0.013**
(0.005)
0.014**
(0.006)
0.014**
(0.006)
MBA CEO 0.002
(0.003)
0.002
(0.003)
0.001
(0.003)
Age 0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
Tenure 0.000
(0.000)
0.000*
(0.000)
0.000*
(0.000)
Female -0.009
(0.012)
-0.016
(0.011)
-0.016
(0.011)
Log TA -0.008***
(0.001)
-0.006***
(0.001)
Tobin’s q -0.004
(0.002)
-0.003
(0.002)
Return 0.007
(0.005)
0.008
(0.005)
Volatility -0.026
(0.040)
-0.023
(0.040)
Cash flow 0.008
(0.045)
0.011
(0.045)
Leverage 0.021*
(0.011)
0.017
(0.011)
Cash-to-assets -0.007
(0.011)
-0.003
(0.011)
Firm age 0.000**
(0.000)
0.000**
(0.000)
Unrelated acquisition -0.008**
(0.003)
All stock acquisition -0.004
(0.008)
Relative deal value 0.001
(0.006)
Private target -0.005
(0.003)
Public target -0.024***
(0.004)
Tender offer 0.007
(0.006)
Hostile bid 0.013
(0.010)
Challenged bid 0.000
(0.008)
Cross border bid 0.001
(0.003)
Fixed effects No No Industry, Year Industry, Year
Observations 2,382 2,382 2,382 2,382
Adjusted R2 0.003 0.004 0.103 0.123
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The observed higher announcement returns may, however, also be explained by the type of
acquisitions that lawyer CEOs engage in. Unrelated acquisitions are typically interpreted as
symptoms for managerial empire building and thus markets tend to have a negative reaction towards
them. The same is true for cross-border acquisitions, which may in some cases be value-enhancing
from a synergy perspective, but often are more related to geographical diversification. Thus, if lawyer
CEOs were more likely to engage in unrelated or cross-border acquisitions, it could result in higher
CAR. Even though these effects are mitigated by including them as binary control variables in
Column 4 of Table VI, I regress acquisition characteristics as dependent variables on lawyer CEOs
to further study their relation.
Lawyers may also use different payment methods for the acquisitions. When acquisitions are
paid for with the acquirer’s stock, the valuation risk related to the target is mitigated. However, as
all-stock acquisitions typically signal overvaluation of the company, the market reaction may be
negative due to the revelation effect (see e.g. Wang 2018). Finally, lawyer CEOs may have a better
completion rate in their acquisitions, if they are more able to anticipate the outcome of legal due
diligence or the antitrust authorities’ reaction or avoid litigation by existing shareholders which is
shown to increase the risk of not completing the acquisition (Krishnan et al. 2012).
I study these possible explanations by logistic regressions with the dependent variable a binary
variable with the value 1 if the acquisition is unrelated, cross-border, all stock or not completed and
Lawyer CEO, as well as other CEO, firm, transaction, year and industry control variables are used as
independent variables. The results are presented in Table VII and coefficients are presented as odds
ratios. The results show opposite evidence for Hypothesis Five: Lawyer CEO seems to associate with
more unrelated acquisitions, more cross-border acquisitions, they are less likely to do all stock
financed acquisitions and have a lower completion rate of acquisitions. However, only the observation
for unrelated acquisitions is statistically significant. Thus, acquisition characteristics do not seem to
explain why lawyer CEOs have higher announcement day returns for their acquisitions than non-
lawyer peers.
The control variable effects are intuitive. Unrelated acquisitions tend to be smaller and are more
likely for public targets, cross border bids are less likely to be financed all stock, and more likely to
be tendered and challenged, and all stock acquisitions tend to occur when the acquirers previous
year’s Tobin’s q and volatility are high, or when the target is publicly listed. Acquisitions are more
likely  to  be  not  completed  when  the  acquisition  is  large,  the  target  is  public  or  when  the  deal  is
challenged, while tendering increases the completion rate.
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Table VII: Acquisition characteristics and outcomes, logistic regressions
This table shows the results of logistic regressions where the dependent variable is a binary variable that equals one if the target
company is in a different 2-digit SIC industry than the acquirer, if the bid is a cross border bid, if the acquisition is financed all stock
or if the acquisition is not completed. Coefficients are reported as odds ratios. The observations are on the transaction level and only
include large acquisitions. Lawyer CEO is a binary variable that equals one if the company has a CEO with a law degree. All control
variables are defined in Appendix A and firm control variables are lagged by one year. Other CEO effects are MBA CEO, Age,
Tenure and Female, none of which are statistically significant. Standard errors are presented in parentheses and are adjusted for
potential heteroscedasticity. The statistical significance of the coefficients is reported: *significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, ***
significant at 1%.
Unrelated acquisition Cross-border bid All stock acquisition Not completed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Lawyer CEO 1.085
(0.156)
1.388*
(0.234)
0.981
(0.163)
1.138
(0.222)
0.713
(0.220)
0.897
(0.334)
0.834
(0.212)
1.037
(0.373)
Log TA 0.915*
(0.042)
1.084
(0.054)
1.082
(0.102)
1.040
(0.091)
Tobin’s q 0.970
(0.056)
0.948
(0.054)
1.469***
(0.117)
0.825*
(0.085)
Return 1.033
(0.143)
1.291*
(0.198)
0.978
(0.225)
1.023
(0.270)
Volatility 0.448
(0.501)
9.463*
(11.419)
>100***
(>100)
0.104
(0-193)
Cash flow 0.470
(0.732)
0.049**
(0.069)
0.128
(0.329)
0.009**
(0.022)
Leverage 1.278
(0.497)
1.080
(0.440)
2.026
(1.678)
1.770
(1.199)
Cash-to-assets 0.984
(0.387)
0.623
(0.263)
0.442
(0.366)
1.079
(0.804)
Firm age 1.008***
(0.003)
1.003
(0.003)
0.992
(0.007)
1.000
(0.005)
Unrelated 0.952
(0.109)
0.874
(0.195)
1.191
(0.246)
All stock 0.868
(0.178)
0.468***
(0.131)
2.079**
(0.675)
Relative deal value 0.619***
(0.152)
0.515***
(0.103)
2.313***
(0.648)
1.612**
(0.339)
Private target 1.3265*
(0.152)
0.669***
(0.089)
1.955**
(0.620)
0.737
(0.198)
Public target 1.400**
(0.193)
0.642***
(0.101)
10.740***
(3.425)
2.173***
(0.536)
Tender offer 1.079
(0.197)
2.220***
(0.428)
0.188***
(0.068)
0.298***
(0.110)
Hostile bid 1.016
(0.438)
0.563
(0.307)
2.636
(2.095)
3.110**
(1.753)
Challenged bid 0.593*
(0.159)
2.497***
(0.675)
0.461
(0.237)
6.421***
(1.980)
Cross border 0.949
(0.108)
0.439**
(0.145)
1.160
(0.249)
Other CEO effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Fixed effects No Ind., Year No Ind., Year No Ind., Year No Ind., Year
Observations 2,382 2,370 2,382 2,291 2,382 2,077 2,382 2,197
Pseudo R2 0.000 0.127 0.000 0.088 0.001 0.370 0.000 0.191
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5.4 Firm value
Lawyer  CEOs  are  shown  to  have  a  negative  relation  with  firm  value  measured  by  Tobin’s  q,
except for companies with a high litigation risk (Henderson et al. 2017). The authors explain the
lower valuations by the observation that lawyer CEOs have a negative effect on investments, which
may lower future cash flows. The effect is off-set if the company has a high litigation risk. Previously,
I find that lawyer CEOs associate positively with announcement day returns for acquisitions, and that
the effects are not explained by acquisition characteristics or acquisition outcomes. If lawyers make
better acquisitions, lawyer CEOs should be valuable in acquisitive companies. This could be reflected
in their valuation measured by Tobin’s q. I define acquisitive companies as the firms that are in the
top quadrant on their average number of large acquisitions per year. In line with Henderson et al.
(2017), I run OLS regressions with the dependent variable as the Tobin’s q of the company, and with
Lawyer CEO, Acquisitive company, and their interaction as well as a matrix of control variables as
independent variables. The results are presented in Table VIII.
Column 1 presents the results of univariate regressions. Highly acquisitive companies associate
with significantly lower Tobin’s q values, which is in line with the average value-destruction of
acquisitions17 (Moeller et al. 2005). The effect for Lawyer CEO is negative as shown by Henderson
et al. (2017), although it is not statistically significant. The effect of lawyer CEOs in acquisitive
companies is shown by the Lawyer CEO * Acquisitive company interaction coefficient, which is also
negative although statistically insignificant. I add CEO specific control variables in Column 2 and
firm, year and industry specific control variables in Column 3. With the inclusion of controls, lawyer
CEOs in acquisitive companies seem to have a significant negative effect on the Tobin’s q, which is
contradictory to the higher announcement day returns documented in Table VI. Thus, Hypothesis Six
is not supported by empirical evidence, and the results do not support the interpretation that lawyers
are better acquirers. Control variables are in line with Henderson et al. (2017): large or highly levered
companies tend to have lower Tobin’s q values, while ROA and volatility associate positively with
the valuation. Interestingly, female CEOs seem to associate with lower Tobin’s q values.
The results presented in Table VIII suggest that making significantly better acquisitions do not
seem to explain the observed higher announcement day returns, as otherwise lawyer CEOs should be
valued in acquisitive companies. However, it is also possible that lawyer CEOs are better acquirers
but lack other skills required for highly acquisitive companies which outweigh the higher
announcement day returns and thus result in a lower Tobin’s q value. However, it should be kept in
17 Between 1980 and 2001, shareholders of acquiring companies lost more than $220 billion upon the announcement of
acquisitions (Moeller et al. 2005).
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mind that Tobin’s q is not the only measure for valuation and thus the results are rather indicative
than conclusive, and careful interpretation should be followed when establishing potential relations.
Table VIII: Tobin’s q, OLS regressions
This table shows the results of OLS regressions where the dependent variable is the Tobin’s q of the company. The observations
are on the firm-year level. Lawyer CEO is a binary variable that equals one if the company has a CEO with a law degree. Acquisitive
company is a binary variable that equals one if the company is in the top quadrant of the sample measured by the average number
of announced large acquisitions per year. All control variables are defined in Appendix A and firm control variables are lagged by
one year. Standard errors are presented in parentheses and are adjusted for potential heteroscedasticity. The statistical significance
of the coefficients is reported: *significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
Tobin’s q
(1) (2) (3)
Lawyer CEO -0.059
(0.055)
-0.068
(0.056)
0.022
(0.050)
Acquisitive company -0.475***
(0.024)
-0.474***
(0.023)
-0.382***
(0.025)
Lawyer CEO * Acq. company -0.063
(0.067)
-0.074
(0.068)
-0.127**
(0.062)
MBA CEO -0.016
(0.023)
-0.009
(0.022)
Age -0.023***
0.002)
-0.020***
(0.002)
Tenure 0.018***
(0.002)
0.014***
(0.002)
Female -0.147**
(0.068)
-0.221***
(0.064)
Log TA -0.057**
(0.010)
ROA 2.404***
(0.471)
Leverage -0.982***
(0.151)
Volatility 0.133***
(0.307)
Fixed effects No No Industry * Year
Observations 13,370 13,370 13,370
Adjusted R2 0.016 0.037 0.206
6. Robustness and causality
This  Chapter  presents  the  additional  tests  for  robustness  and  causality.  Section  6.1  covers
difference-in-differences analyses, and Section 6.2 analyses with varied sub-samples. Section 6.3
presents the results of analysing different time intervals for announcement returns, and Section 6.4
presents results from the CEO overconfidence analysis. This Chapter is finished with Section 6.5
which covers the outlier analysis.
6.1 Differences-in-differences analysis
To further evaluate the robustness of results, I verify regressions using difference-in-differences
methodology. The methodology requires a CEO transition to take place and compares the non-lawyer
45
to lawyer transitions with a non-lawyer to non-lawyer control group. The benefit of this methodology
is that it effectively controls for factors that relate to a CEO transition. Furthermore, the methodology
allows the inclusion of firm fixed effects as control variables, and thus the change in firm policies
related to the new presence of a lawyer CEO is better captured. The limitation of the methodology is
that it significantly decreases sample size, as not all companies have CEO transitions. The
methodology also excludes all lawyer-to-lawyer and lawyer-to-non-lawyer CEO transitions.
Furthermore, only one transition per company can be included in the sample, and thus if the company
has more than two different CEOs over the sample other transitions are excluded18. Consequently,
the sample size is significantly reduced: for example, the firm-year observations in investment
policies decrease from 13,370 to 2,723 observations. A final limitation is that only a relatively short
period of years pre- and post-transition can be included. Thus, the effects studied must occur three
years post-transition which may be an insufficiently long time period for large changes to take place.
I begin the difference-in-differences analysis from the investment policies of the company.
Consistent with Huang and Kisgen (2013) I include three years of firm-year observations before the
transition and three years after the transition, while excluding the transition year. I require the
company to have at least two years of data available before the CEO transition to be included in the
sample. The results are presented in Table IX.
The lawyer CEO effect on capital expenditures is presented in Columns 1-3. Univariate
regressions in Column 1 suggest that companies that have a non-lawyer to lawyer CEO transition
associate with significantly lower capital expenditures and the effect remains negative and significant
after the inclusion of firm control variables as well as year fixed effects in Column 2. However, the
effect diminishes after the inclusion of firm fixed effects in Column 319. The observation is consistent
with Huang and Kisgen (2013), who also experience a significant increase in the coefficient of
determination while the significance of CEO specific effects decreases. Interestingly, the interaction
between  lawyer  and  post  is  not  significant,  meaning  that  there  is  no  significant  change  in  capital
expenditure post-transition, but rather lawyer CEOs are hired to companies that have lower capital
expenditures to begin with.
Similar  results  are  obtained  for  R&D  in  Columns  4-6,  although  here  it  is  noteworthy  that  the
effects are not statistically significant. This is likely due to smaller sample size, highlighted in Column
6 where none of the variables reach statistical significance. Furthermore, the inclusion of firm fixed
18 When multiple CEO transitions within one company exist, I include the latest (non-lawyer-to-lawyer, if available)
transition with sufficient firm-year observations.
19 I exclude the unnecessary lawyer dummy variable from regressions where firm fixed effects are included.
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effects in Column 6 and the subsequent loss of statistical significance for the coefficients suggests
that R&D expenditures may be less sensitive to year-on-year changes in the variables, which is
intuitive due to the long-term nature of R&D investments.
Table IX: Investment policies, difference-in-differences regressions
This table shows the results of difference-in differences regressions where the dependent variable is capital expenditure to net
tangible assets in Columns 1-3 and in R&D expenditure to total sales in Columns 4-6. The observations are on the firm-year level
and exclude the CEO transition year. Post is a binary variable that equals one if the year t is after the CEO transition. Lawyer is a
binary variable that equals one if the company has a non-lawyer to lawyer CEO transition. All control variables are defined in
Appendix A and firm control variables are lagged by one year. Standard errors are presented in parentheses and are adjusted for
potential heteroscedasticity. The statistical significance of the coefficients is reported: *significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, ***
significant at 1%.
CapEx R&D
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post × Lawyer -0.001
(0.016)
0.012
(0.012)
0.005
(0.008)
0.008
(0.023)
0.020
(0.023)
0.003
(0.014)
Post -0.011**
(0.005)
-0.014**
(0.006)
0.011
(0.010)
-0.015
(0.016)
-0.018
(0.020)
-0.015
(0.026)
Lawyer -0.025**
(0.012)
-0.031***
(0.009)
-0.022
(0.018)
-0.035*
(0.018)
Log TA -0.007***
(0.002)
0.003
(0.011)
-0.015**
(0.006)
-0.003
(0.028)
ROA -0.005
(0.031)
0.085***
(0.032)
-0.670***
(0.205)
0.030
(0.103)
Tobin’s q 0.031***
(0.017)
0.019***
(0.005)
0.043***
(0.008)
-0.011
(0.009)
Leverage -0.135***
(0.017)
-0.067**
(0.028)
-0.188***
(0.053)
-0.120
(0.084)
Return 0.001
(0.007)
0.013**
(0.006)
-0.028
(0.022)
-0.025
(0.016)
Volatility 0.205***
(0.056)
-0.101*
(0.058)
0.355**
(0.157)
-0.122
(0.136)
Firm fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes
Year fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 2,723 2,723 2,723 1,602 1,602 1,602
Adjusted R2 0.006 0.174 0.678 0.001 0.122 0.638
I  continue  the  analysis  to  cover  leverage  and  cash-to-asset  rations.  The  same  sampling
methodology is used as for investment policies, and the results are presented in Table X. The results
are again in-line with the previous findings from OLS regressions, although the effect on Leverage
in Columns 1-3 is no longer statistically significant when the difference-in-differences approach is
used. For Cash-to-assets in Columns 4-5, the Lawyer coefficient is significant and negative while the
Post x Lawyer interaction is not, again suggesting that lawyer CEOs tend to join companies with
lower cash-to-assets ratios rather than decrease them post-transition. When firm fixed effects are
included in Column 6, the lawyer effect diminishes.
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Table X: Leverage and cash-to-assets, difference-in-differences regressions
This table shows the results of difference-in-differences regressions where the dependent variable is the debt in current book
liabilities plus long-term book debt to total assets ratio of the company in Columns 1-3 and the cash and marketable securities to
total asset ratio of the company in Columns 4-6. The observations are on the firm-year level and exclude the CEO transition year.
Post is a binary variable that equals one if the year t is after the CEO transition. Lawyer is a binary variable that equals one if the
company has a non-lawyer to lawyer CEO transition. All control variables are defined in Appendix A and firm control variables are
lagged by one year. Standard errors are presented in parentheses and are adjusted for potential heteroscedasticity. The statistical
significance of the coefficients is reported: *significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
Leverage Cash-to-assets
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post × Lawyer 0.017
(0.018)
0.008
(0.016)
0.012
(0.008)
-0.006
(0.014)
0.008
(0.013)
-0.005
(0.008)
Post -0.003
(0.006)
0.003
(0.007)
-0.007
(0.007)
0.007
(0.006)
0.000
(0.006)
0.014**
(0.006)
Lawyer 0.001
(0.013)
0.000
(0.012)
-0.037***
(0.011)
-0.040***
(0.010)
Log TA 0.017***
(0.002)
0.023**
(0.009)
-0.011***
(0.002)
-0.057***
(0.010)
ROA -0.108***
(0.040)
-0.078***
(0.025)
-0.216***
(0.042)
-0.007
(0.023)
Tobin’s q -0.018***
(0.003)
-0.002
(0.004)
0.041***
(0.004)
0.007*
(0.004)
Asset tangibility 0.096***
(0.015)
0.092*
(0.049)
-0.177***
(0.010)
-0.331***
(0.044)
Dividend paying 0.035***
(0.006)
0.017**
(0.007)
-0.068***
(0.006)
-0.007
(0.007)
Sales growth 0.010
(0.015)
-0.003
(0.011)
-0.021
(0.018)
-0.018*
(0.010)
Firm fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes
Year fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 2,723 2,723 2,723 2,723 2,723 2,723
Adjusted R2 0.001 0.116 0.790 0.004 0.310 0.839
The final robustness test with the difference-in-differences methodology is on the number of large
acquisitions announced by the company. The results are presented in Table XI. The results are in line
with OLS regressions: no significant changes in acquisition propensity is observed after a transition
from a non-lawyer CEO to a lawyer CEO. The effect is slightly positive as expected based on the
previous results, but not statistically significant. As opposed to the previous difference-in-difference
regressions, firm fixed effects are replaced by industry fixed effects as otherwise the variation
between acquisitiveness would have to happen within a 6-year period, i.e. 3 years before and 3 years
after an executive transition, within one company. Since the threshold for large acquisitions is high,
these requirements would not yield enough variation within companies for meaningful analysis or
interpretations.
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Table XI: Acquisitiveness, difference-in-differences regressions
This table shows the results of difference-in-differences regressions where the dependent variable is the number of announced
large acquisitions. The observations are on the firm-year level and exclude the CEO transition year. Post is a binary variable that
equals one if the year t is after the CEO transition. Lawyer is a binary variable that equals one if the company has a non-lawyer to
lawyer CEO transition. All control variables are defined in Appendix A and firm control variables are lagged by one year. Standard
errors are presented in parentheses and are adjusted for potential heteroscedasticity. The statistical significance of the coefficients
is reported: *significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
N(large acquisition)
(1) (2) (3)
Post × Lawyer 0.065
(0.050)
0.066
(0.051)
0.064
(0.051)
Post 0.010
(0.017)
0.026
(0.020)
0.028
(0.020)
Lawyer -0.014
(0.033)
-0.013
(0.033)
-0.010
(0.034)
Log TA -0.010
(0.006)
-0.011*
(0.006)
Tobin’s q -0.026***
(0.007)
-0.025***
(0.007)
Return 0.090***
(0.027)
0.088***
(0.026)
Cash flow 0.200
(0.214)
0.218
(0.215)
Firm age 0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
Industry fixed effects No No Yes
Year fixed effects No Yes Yes
Observations 2,723 2,723 2,723
Adjusted R2 0.001 0.027 0.043
From the difference-in-differences regressions I conclude that the results from Chapter 5 appear
to hold, although results seem to be driven by CEO-firm matching rather than deliberate change in
firm policies after the transition from a non-lawyer to lawyer CEO.
6.2 Sub-sample analysis
For studying the robustness of announcement day returns, I choose a different methodology as
the difference-in-differences approach would decrease the number of possible acquisitions to be
included in the analysis. Specifically, using similar sampling methodology as in the difference-in-
differences  analysis  would  yield  only  48  acquisitions  for  firms  with  a  non-lawyer-to-lawyer  CEO
transition, of which 18 would occur before the transition and 30 afterwards. This is not large enough
of a sample to observe statistically significant results, and thus the difference-in-differences
methodology is not applied to announcement day returns.
Instead, I run OLS regressions on four sub-samples of the main sample. I restrict the sample by
acquirer size, deal size, target public status and randomization. The dependent variable is the three
day [-1, +1] cumulative abnormal return surrounding the acquisition announcement, while
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independent variables include the same panel of control variables as in Table VI. The results are
presented in Table XII, and the full table with control variable effects is presented in Appendix B.
Table XII: Announcement returns, subsample analysis
This table shows the results of OLS regressions where the dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return in percentage
points three days surrounding the announcement day [-1 +1]. Columns 1-2 include acquisitions where the acquirer is an S&P 500
company. Columns 3-4 include acquisitions that have a transaction value exceeding 10% of the acquirer’s previous year market
capitalization. Columns 5-6 include acquisitions where the target is a publicly listed company. Columns 7-8 include a randomized
50% sub-sample. The observations are on the transaction level. Lawyer CEO is a binary variable that equals one if the company has
a CEO with a law degree. Control variables and their effects are presented in Table XXI in Appendix B. Standard errors are presented
in parentheses and are adjusted for potential heteroscedasticity. The statistical significance of the coefficients is reported:
*significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
S&P 500 acquirers (CAR) Very large deals (CAR) Public targets (CAR) Random 50% (CAR)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Lawyer CEO 0.019*** 0.022***
(0.008)
0.014*
(0.007)
0.015*
(0.008)
0.027***
(0.009)
0.022**
(0.010)
0.016**
(0.007)
0.014*
(0.007)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Fixed effects No Ind., Year No Ind., Year No Ind., Year No Ind., Year
Observations 1,048 1,048 1,480 1,480 746 746 1,206 1,206
Adjusted R2 0.009 0.208 0.003 0.185 0.013 0.244 0.005 0.170
In Columns 1-2 I include acquisitions where the acquirer is in the S&P 500 index at some point
of the sample period. This decreases the number of acquisitions from 2,382 to 1,048. Columns 3-4
include acquisitions with a transaction value above 10% of the acquirer’s market capitalization, and
thus decreases the number of acquisitions to 1,480. In Columns 5-6 I include acquisitions with a
publicly listed target company, which restricts the sample to 746 acquisitions. In Columns 7-8 I
analyze a sub-sample where I have dropped 50% of the acquisitions in the sample randomly.
The Lawyer CEO effect remains positive and statistically significant throughout all subsamples,
and interestingly the coefficient receives its highest value when only acquisitions including public
targets are included in the sample. Conclusively, while the sub-sample approach does not allow for
studying endogeneity as well as the difference-in-differences analysis, the results remain robust and
significant.
6.3 Different time intervals analysis
I expand the analysis on cumulative announcement returns to cover different time intervals. While
[-1, +1] is the most common interval for studying acquisition announcement returns (see e.g.,
Malmendier and Tate 2008, Huang and Kisgen 2013, Yim 2013, Bernile et al. 2017), including other
time intervals will further improve our understanding on the market’s reaction. I study the cumulative
abnormal return on the announcement day, the 5-day period [-2, +2], the 7-day period [-1, +5] and
the 11-day period [-5, +5] surrounding the announcement of a large acquisition. I include the same
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control variables as previously and present the results in Table XIII. The full table with control
variable effects is presented in Appendix B.
Table XIII: Announcement returns, different time intervals
This table shows the results of OLS regressions where the dependent variable is the CAR in percentage points. Columns 1-2
include the announcement day, Columns 3-4 [-2, +2] days, Columns 5-6 [-1, +5] days and Columns 7-8 [-5, +5] days around the
announcement. The observations are on the transaction level and only include large acquisitions. Lawyer CEO is a binary variable
that  equals one if  the company has a CEO with a law degree.  Control  variables and their  effects are presented in Table XXII in
Appendix B. Standard errors are presented in parentheses and are adjusted for potential heteroscedasticity. The statistical
significance of the coefficients is reported: *significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
Announcement day CAR [-2, +2] CAR [-1, +5] CAR [-5, +5]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Lawyer CEO 0.002
(0.004)
0.002
(0.004)
0.014**
(0.005)
0.014**
(0.006)
0.012**
(0.005)
0.012**
(0.006)
0.008
(0.006)
0.008
(0.007)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Fixed effects No Ind., Year No Ind., Year No Ind., Year No Ind., Year
Observations 2,382 2,382 2,382 2,382 2,380 2,380 2,378 2,378
Adjusted R2 0.000 0.111 0.003 0.112 0.002 0.100 0.001 0.087
The positive effect of Lawyer CEO remains throughout the different time intervals, although it is
not statistically significant when only the announcement day is included, or during the 11-day period
of [-5, +5]. The results suggest that the positive effect is strongest during the days after the acquisition,
not on the exact announcement day or the period before the announcement.
I also conduct preliminary regressions on the long-term abnormal return after the transaction. I
regress the 1-month, 3-month, 6-month and 12-month CAR starting from the announcement date of
an acquisition to Lawyer CEO and present the results of these univariate regressions in Table XIV20.
Table XIV: Stock returns post acquisition
This table shows the results of OLS regressions where the dependent variable is the CAR in percentage points at different time
periods after the announcement of a large acquisitions. The observations are on the transaction level and only include large
acquisitions. Lawyer CEO is a binary variable that equals one if the company has a CEO with a law degree. Standard errors are
presented in parentheses and are adjusted for potential heteroscedasticity. The statistical significance of the coefficients is reported:
*significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
1-month CAR 3-month CAR 6-month CAR 12-month CAR
Lawyer CEO 0.002
(0.009)
0.018
(0.015)
-0.002
(0.024)
-0.045
(0.037)
Controls No No No No
Observations 2,341 2,254 2,046 1,683
Adjusted R2 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001
20 The number of observations decreases when the required time interval is increased due to the fixed nature of stock price
data I have gathered for the thesis. As the analysis is preliminary and indicative, I only include stock returns that I have
available from other analyses in the thesis. When sufficient amount of stock returns are not available, the acquisition is
excluded. For example, I do not gather stock price data for 2015, and thus all acquisitions from 2014 are excluded from
the 12-month-CAR analysis. As the fraction of lawyer CEOs is stable across years, and furthermore as the lawyer effect
should not correlate with the exclusion methodology, the sampling does not affect the interpretation of results.
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I find no significant effect for Lawyer CEO on the long-term post-acquisition abnormal stock
return. The results are preliminary and indicative as no control variables are included and since it is
very difficult to isolate the effect of an acquisition on the stock return. Thus, caution should be
exercised when making interpretations. However, the results do not indicate that acquisitions
announced by lawyer CEOs would have significantly higher long-term stock returns.
6.4 CEO overconfidence analysis
One possible explanation for the observed results is CEO overconfidence as many of the
hypotheses in this thesis build on the potential risk-aversion of lawyer CEOs. I follow Malmendier
and Tate (2005) and study the perceived risk-aversion of lawyer CEOs. If lawyer CEOs are more
risk-averse, they should associate with less overconfident stock option holding patterns. Specifically,
they should be less likely to be categorized as Holder 67, Longholder and Net buyer. Following the
argumentation of Huang and Kisgen (2013), lawyer CEOs should also have better career outcomes if
they are less overconfident, as overconfidence typically leads to value-destructive decisions and
subsequent replacement. Career outcomes are measured by the probability of being replaced within
4 years of CEO appointment, excluding CEOs who serve for less than 2 years.
I study the mean difference of lawyer CEOs and non-lawyer CEOs to be replaced in 4 years, hold
options  that  are  67%  in-the-money  (Holder  67),  hold  options  until  the  last  year  of  expiration
(Longholder), and buy more stock on net than sell (Net buyer). Consistent with Malmendier and Tate
(2005), I only include CEOs that at some point of their career have held in-the-money options for the
Holder 67 and Longholder tests, as then all CEOs categorized as overconfident have had the
possibility to exercise their options. For Holder 67 and Longholder tests I require a CEO to have held
the  position  for  at  least  four  years  to  be  included  in  the  sample,  and  for  Net  buyer  five  years  of
observations are required. The results of the mean difference tests are presented in Table XV21.
Table XV: Career outcomes and stock purchasing behaviour
This table shows the likelihood of executives to be replaced within their first 4 years of tenure as well as their stock purchasing
behaviours. Observations are at the CEO-level. All variables are defined in Appendix A. The statistical significance of the t statistic
is reported: *significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
Lawyer CEO Non-lawyer CEO Difference t-statistic Observations
Replaced in 4 years 23.9 % 21.9 % 2.0 % 0.37 849
Holder 67 59.7% 53.1% 6.6 % 1.38 1 421
Longholder 48.8 % 40.0 % 8.9 % 1.57 900
Net buyer 80.4 % 71.4 % 9.0 % 1.85* 1 001
21 The lower number of observations for the Longholder test compared to the Holder 67 test is explained by limited data
availability, as the expiration date of executive options are available in ExecuComp between 2006 and 2014 while other
variables can be constructed for the entire period of 1999 – 2014.
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The risk-aversion argument is not supported by the evidence: lawyer CEOs do not exhibit lower
but rather higher likelihoods of being categorized as overconfident, of which the Net buyer mean
difference  is  statistically  significant.  Conclusively,  lower  overconfidence  does  not  seem  to  be  the
primary driver of observed results such as lower investment or higher announcement day returns.
6.5 Outlier analysis
I analyze the outliers in my sample for non-binary dependent variables to verify that results are
not driven by extreme end-tail observations. I begin the outlier analysis by examining the bottom five
and top five observations in the sample. I present the mean as well as the top five and bottom five
observations for each non-binary dependent variable in Table XVI and indicate if the observation if
associated to a lawyer CEO by *. The bottom five observations for CapEx, R&D, Leverage, Cash-to-
assets and the number of large acquisitions are zero and thus are excluded from the table.
Table XVI: Outlier observations, top 5 and bottom 5
This table shows the top three and bottom three observations for each dependent variable. Observations are on the firm-year
level except for CAR, which is observed at the transaction level. If the variable is associated with a lawyer CEO, it is denoted by *.
Mean Bottom five observations Top five observations
CapEx 0.23 3.28 2.37 2.06*  1.76* 1.70
R&D 0.09 7.16 5.86 5.68 4.73 4.17
Leverage 0.21 2.46 1.44 1.39 1.35 1.25
Cash-to-
assets
0.15 0.95 0.94 0.91 0.91 0.91
CAR 0.01 -0.40 -0.35 -0.33 -0.29 -0.26 0.49 0.40 0.38 0.38 0.38*
Tobin’s q 2.05 0.33 0.40 0.41 0.49 0.50 17.55 16.14 16.00 15.94 15.25
From the outlier table it can be observed that results do not seem to be driven by the most extreme
outliers. Lawyer CEOs are represented within the five extreme-tail observations only in three
instances: twice at the positive end of CapEx (while the documented effect for lawyer CEOs on
average is negative), and once in the positive end of CAR although four acquisitions with better CAR
are  announced  by  non-lawyer  CEOs.  Thus,  it  can  be  concluded  that  outliers  are  not  significantly
distorting results or their interpretation.
I  continue  the  outlier  analysis  by  examining  the  top  1% and bottom 1% of  observations,  and
document the percentage of lawyer CEOs within these extremes. The results are presented in Table
XVII. Lawyer CEOs are evenly represented in the extreme ends of the capital expenditure sample.
However, the analysis suggests that the negative R&D effect may be driven by extreme R&D values
by  non-lawyer  CEOs,  as  no  lawyer  CEOs  are  within  the  top  1%  of  the  sample  in  terms  of  R&D
investments. Leverage and cash-to-assets results are in line with the observed results, as lawyer CEOs
are more presented at the top end of leverage and bottom end of cash-to-assets observations. For the
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cumulative abnormal returns the observation is even stronger, as almost 21% of the best acquisitions
measured by announcement day return are announced by companies with lawyer CEOs which is
significantly larger than the 9% representation of lawyer CEOs in the total acquisition sample.
However, interpretations from the observation should be cautious as the absolute numbers are low.
Table XVII: Outlier observations, top 1% and bottom 1%
This table shows the top three and bottom three observations for each dependent variable. Observations are on the firm-year
level except for CAR, which is observed at the transaction level. If the variable is associated with a lawyer CEO, it is denoted by *.
Bottom 1% of sample Top 1% of sample
Lawyer CEOs Observations % of total Lawyer CEOs Observations % of total
CapEx 20 134 14.9% 20 134 14.9%
R&D 13 75 17.3% 0 75 0.0%
Leverage 6 134 4.5% 18 134 13.4%
Cash-to-
assets
19 134 14.1% 11 134 8.2%
CAR 1 24 4.1% 5 24 20.8%
Tobin’s q 12 134 9.0% 18 134 13.4%
Because of the extreme-end concerns raised by Table XVII, I finish the outlier analysis by
windsorizing the observations at 99%, i.e. by setting the value of bottom 1% observations to the value
of the 1st percentile and the value of top 1% of observations to the value of the 99th percentile. This
mitigates the effect of extreme-tail observations. I include the same control variables as in earlier
regressions, and present the results for windsorized regressions for CapEx, R&D, Leverage and Cash-
to-assets with Lawyer CEO in  Table  XVIII.  The  effects  after  the  windsorization  are  in  line  with
previous results, confirming that the findings are not driven by the values of the 1% extreme-tail
observations.
Table XVIII: Investment policies and capital structure, windsorized observations
This table shows the results of OLS regressions where the dependent variable is capital expenditure to net tangible assets in
Columns 1-2, R&D expenditure to total sales in Coulmns 3-4, the debt in current book liabilities plus long-term book debt to total
assets ratio of the company in Columns 5-6 and the cash and marketable securities to total asset ratio of the company in Columns
7-8. The observations are on the firm-year level and are windsorized at 99%. Lawyer CEO is a binary variable that equals one if the
company has a CEO with a law degree. The same control variables are used as in previous regressions, see Tables III and IV.
Standard errors are presented in parentheses and are adjusted for potential heteroscedasticity. The statistical significance of the
coefficients is reported: *significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
CapEx R&D Leverage Cash-to-assets
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Lawyer CEO -0.014***
(0.004)
-0.011***
(0.003)
-0.026***
(0.004)
-0.013***
(0.003)
0.037***
(0.005)
0.023**
(0.004)
-0.023***
(0.005)
-0.009**
(0.004)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Fixed effects No Ind. *Year No Ind. *Year No Ind. *Year No Ind. *Year
Observations 13,370 13,370 7,452 7,452 13,370 13,370 13,370 13,370
Adjusted R2 0.001 0.307 0.004 0.286 0.005 0.226 0.002 0.363
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Finally,  I  windsorize  the  observations  at  99%  for  the  three-day  [-1,  +1]  cumulative  abnormal
return surrounding acquisition announcements. I regress the CAR with Lawyer CEO for the
windsorized observations and present the results in Table XIX.
Table XIX: Announcement returns, windsorized observations
This table shows the results of OLS regressions where the dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return in percentage
points three days surrounding the announcement day [-1 +1]. The observations are on the transaction level, only include large
acquisitions and are windsorized at 99%. Lawyer CEO is a binary variable that equals one if the company has a CEO with a law
degree. All control variables are defined in Appendix A and firm control variables are lagged by one year. Standard errors are
presented in parentheses and are adjusted for potential heteroscedasticity. The statistical significance of the coefficients is reported:
*significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
CAR [-1, +1]
(1) (2)
Lawyer CEO 0.011**
(0.005)
0.012**
(0.005)
Controls No Yes
Fixed effects No Industry, Year
Observations 2,382 2,382
Adjusted R2 0.002 0.117
The positive effect of Lawyer CEO remains statistically significant after the windsorization of
the observations, confirming that the observed higher announcement returns are not driven by the
values of observations in the 1% extreme-tail.
7. Discussion of results
This Chapter discusses the results of empirical results from Chapter 5 and the robustness tests
from Chapter 6, interpreting the observations and constructing potential causal links based on the
empirical evidence as well as existing research.
The empirical results suggest differences between corporate policies when comparing companies
with lawyer CEOs to their non-lawyer-CEO peers. Lawyer risk-aversion, however, does not receive
consistent empirical support. While CapEx and R&D have a robust negative association with lawyer
CEOs as documented by Henderson et al. (2017), other policies such as leverage, the cash-to-assets
ratio and acquisitiveness do not show effects consistent with lawyer CEO risk-aversion. In fact,
contrary to risk-averseness, companies with lawyer CEOs tend to have more debt and less cash than
the baseline. Furthermore, risk-aversion should relate to a lower number of acquisitions (Malmendier
and Tate 2008, Huang and Kisgen 2013), an effect which is not found for lawyer CEOs.
Finally, lawyer CEOs are not less likely to be categorized as overconfident based on their option
holding strategies. This result may however be driven by lower financial sophistication rather than
overconfidence. For example, MBA CEOs may, due to their financial education, have a better
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understanding of diversifying their personal financial risk by executing options early than lawyer
CEOs. Conclusively, while it is possible that lawyers exhibit risk-averse behavior towards certain
areas of corporate policies such as capital expenditures, a general categorization of lawyer CEO risk-
aversion is not empirically established.
As expected in Hypothesis One, the effect of lawyer CEOs towards capital expenditures and
R&D are negative. Higher growth may lead to an increased litigation risk as argued by Henderson et
al. (2017), and thus lawyer CEOs looking to avoid litigation will favor lower investment, especially
in the riskier intangible assets. The difference-in-differences analysis reveals that the effect is not
significant  after  including  firm fixed  effects,  suggesting  that  firm selection  rather  than  an  explicit
change in policies post-transition is driving results.
The conservativeness towards investment is not reflected to the capital structure of the company.
This could be explained by the research of Cao and Narayanamoorthy (2014) who show that leverage
does not increase litigation risk, and thus lawyer CEOs looking to avoid litigation do not have to
avoid leverage. Furthermore, companies facing high litigation risk are shown to accumulate cash in
anticipation of settlements (Arena and Julio, 2015). As lawyer CEOs are successful in avoiding
litigation as shown by Henderson et al. (2017), companies led by lawyers should not need to
accumulate cash to anticipate litigation in a same way as others. Finally, the negative relation between
cash holdings and leverage is extensively documented in finance literature (see e.g., Opler, Pinkowitz,
Stulz and Williamson 1999), and thus it is natural that the effects on leverage and cash-to-assets ratio
are opposite. Conclusively, it seems that litigation-risk-aversion, rather than risk-aversion in general,
is driving the observed effects.
An alternative explanation consistent with the legal astuteness hypothesis argued by Bagley
(2008) is that lawyer CEOs are better in negotiating debt contracts. If lawyer CEOs can receive more
lucrative financing from banks through for example effective contract design or through being more
trustworthy from a lenders point of view, it may be in the best interests of shareholders to hold more
debt. In addition, stock price volatility could explain the observed positive leverage effects. High
stock price volatility is shown to result in downwards leverage adjustments (Chen, Wang and Zhou
2014) which is consistent with the trade-off theory (see e.g., Modigliani and Miller 1958, Scott 1976):
high  volatility  relates  to  a  higher  chance  of  financial  distress,  which  should  be  reflected  as  lower
leverage. On the contrary, as companies with lawyer CEOs have lower volatility (Henderson et al.
2017) their debt capacity may be higher. Studying for example credit ratings of lawyer-led companies
could provide further understanding to the leverage effect, however it remains outside the scope of
this study. Furthermore, studying covenant levels in debt contracts could further improve interpreting
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the results, as covenants typically guide minimum cash balances and may be affected by lawyer
CEOs. However, as the nature of covenants are typically not disclosed, this explanation remains
speculation and is not empirically tested in this thesis.
I  find  a  slightly  positive  effect  for  lawyer  CEOs  related  to  the  probability  to  announce  large
acquisitions. This is contradicting to both risk-aversion in general and litigation-risk aversion, as large
acquisitions are risky to begin with and may result in shareholder litigation (Krishnan et al. 2012).
The effect could potentially be explained by legal astuteness (Bagley 2008): if lawyer CEOs have
skills to navigate the complexity of large acquisitions, and thus can be more certain of acquisition
outcomes, the pool of potential NPV positive acquisitions should be larger as cash flows may be more
secure or higher, or the investment required to complete the acquisition may be lower22. Additionally,
legal advisors, commonly utilized in large acquisitions, have financial and reputational incentives to
overstate the risk to clients, and lawyer CEOs may be better prepared to identify this bias and adjust
their interpretation. Finally, it is possible that lawyers become overconfident when in a complex legal
situation with a potential positive outcome, as is shown for litigators (Kahneman and Lovallo 1993)
and lawyers in general (Goodman-Delahunty et al. 2010) when estimating case outcomes. However,
it should be noted that the effects observed by this study are not statistically significant, and thus no
conclusive interpretation regarding Hypothesis Three should be made.
Interestingly, companies with lawyer CEOs have higher cumulative announcement day returns,
especially when only public target takeovers (with typically negative announcement returns) are
considered. The result is robust to different sub-sample analyses and holds for varied time intervals,
and it is not explained by a better completion rate or by acquisition characteristics such as hostility or
the relatedness of the target’s industry. I discuss three potential explanations for the higher
announcement day returns, although studying their validity is outside the scope of this study due to
data limitations. The explanations are better management of investor expectations, a lowered
litigation risk of acquisitions and more favorable acquisition negotiation outcomes.
The higher announcement returns could be explained by lawyer CEOs managing the expectations
of investors better. As acquisitions, especially the ones with public targets, are shown to be on average
value destroying (see e.g. Andrade et al. 2001, Moeller et al. 2005), a positive CAR effect of lawyer
CEOs could mean a smaller investor reaction i.e. a CAR closer to zero, meaning that the markets
22 Effective contract design may lead to a lower investment required e.g. with earn-outs or through including more stock
as a payment method. Cash flows can be made more secure through better negotiation of claim policy, clauses and through
assigning a larger part of the transaction risks to the buyer. Finally, cash flows post acquisition can become larger through
legal expertise if e.g. patent portfolios are harmonized earlier, legal entities are merger together faster or lower taxes are
achieved through the acquisition.
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would react less to acquisitions announced by companies with lawyer CEOs. This interpretation is
supported by the study of Henderson et al. (2017) who document a similar effect for earnings
announcements communicated by companies with lawyer CEOs, i.e. that the CAR surrounding an
earnings announcement is closer to zero for lawyer CEO companies than for the baseline.
Furthermore, Bamber et al. (2010) show that CEOs with a legal background have conservative
disclosure styles which may also be applicable for acquisitions and thus result in more positive
surprises that are rewarded by higher returns. It is possible that companies with lawyer CEOs are
more transparent with their acquisitive strategies or communicate more realistic expectations when
announcing acquisitions, which could lead to a better reaction by the markets upon announcement.
Finally, lawyer CEOs may have better argumentation or presentation skills in communicating
acquisitions and can thus sweet-talk the market of viewing their acquisitions more favorably. This
interpretation is supported by the observation that highest returns are observed during the period after
the acquisition, a time when CEOs typically guide investors on the deal rationale as well as expected
synergies. However, the fact that earnings announcement by lawyer CEOs receive a more negative
(i.e. closer to zero) reaction somewhat contradicts this view, and suggests that rather than sweet
talking, lawyer CEOs are more effective in managing expectations.
The high presence of litigation risk related to acquisitions documented by Krishnan et al. (2012)
is another possible explanation for the observed results. Given that shareholder lawsuits are relatively
common in large acquisitions, and that they often lead to the termination of an acquisition (Krishnan
et al. 2012) which will have negative impacts on the acquirer through broken deal costs or sunken
resources, markets may value lawyer CEOs in acquisition situations due to their background.
Furthermore, lawyer CEOs may have a better ability to anticipate the actions of antitrust regulators,
or the outcomes of legal due diligence, which can give investors comfort on the validity of the
acquisition and be reflected in the selection of acquisition targets in the first place. While I do not
find significant differences in the completion rates of acquisitions, I do not observe shareholder
lawsuits or antitrust regulators responses per se due to data unavailability. Thus, better acquisition
outcomes from a legal perspective cannot be ruled out as a potential explanation.
A third possible interpretation for the observed higher announcement returns is that lawyer CEOs
are complete better acquisitions e.g. through better negotiation outcomes. Lawyer CEOs may obtain
better terms for key legal documents such as the share purchasing agreement and shareholders
agreement and be thus rewarded by investors. Lawyer CEOs may also be more aware of the risks
related to complex transactions and thus have a better ability in navigating the process, which may
extend to better target selection as well. Investors may have more trust in lawyer CEOs in navigating
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acquisitions and thus react to their announcements positively. This interpretation is, however,
somewhat contradicted by the Tobin’s q test. If lawyers were better acquirers, lawyer CEOs in highly
acquisitive companies should have a positive association with the Tobin’s q value of the company in
a  similar  way  as  high  litigation  risk  and  high  growth  companies  do.  Such  positive  relation  is  not
established empirically by this thesis. Furthermore, I do not find evidence for higher quality
acquisitions by lawyer CEOs in preliminary tests analyzing long-term abnormal returns. Thus, I
remain skeptical on the explanation that lawyer CEOs would be better acquirers.
There are few alternative explanations to higher announcement returns not controlled for by this
study. One possible explanation relates to the anticipation of the acquisition. The anticipation effect
means that markets have a certain degree of anticipation towards acquisitions which already affects
the share price of the company before announcing the acquisition, and that the announcement day
returns only capture the unanticipated component (Wang 2018). The effect has been used to explain
the acquisitiveness puzzle, i.e. why do companies engage in large acquisitions despite them being on
average value destroying, as it biases the market’s reaction upon announcement downward (Wang
2018). The explanation is in line with better investor expectations management. I cannot control for
anticipation empirically, but the results suggest that, regardless of the anticipation effect, the
unanticipated component of the acquisition is more positive for companies with lawyer CEOs. It is
possible that markets assign negative anticipation effects for lawyer CEOs, which reverse upon
announcement and thus drive results, but empirically documenting this is not possible. Controlling
for the anticipation effect e.g. through a structural estimation of a firm optimization model (see Wang
2018) could further enhance our understanding of the potential underlying anticipation effect.
Another possible explanation for the results is the revelation effect, i.e. the tendency of markets
to re-evaluate the stand-alone value of the acquirer in connection with acquisition announcements
(Wang 2018). Large acquisitions are affected by shocks that are unobservable to outside investors,
and once large acquisitions are announced investors can interpret the causes of the acquisition better
and reassess their stand-alone valuation of the company (Wang 2018). In the context of the results
observed in this thesis, if lawyer CEOs are, on average, more present in undervalued companies, then
the revaluation effect would suggest on average higher returns upon announcing large acquisitions as
markets adjust the undervaluation. Indeed, as shown in Appendix B, lawyer CEOs do associate
negatively towards Tobin’s q and previous year stock returns, which could suggest that they are more
present in undervalued companies. Furthermore, lawyer CEOs have a slightly lower probability to
pursue all-stock financed acquisitions which could be explained by undervaluation. However, it
should be noted that the correlations are relatively small, and the lower likelihood of all-stock
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acquisitions is not statistically significant. Thus, revelation can only offer partial explanations to the
observed higher announcement returns.
My thesis has significant contribution to finance literature and increases our understanding on
CEOs and their effect on firm policies. When making CEO hiring decisions, boards can consider the
potential effects an individual’s background as a lawyer may have on corporate policies, and design
incentives  in  a  way  that  steers  the  company  to  the  right  direction.  If  a  company,  for  example,  is
looking to pursue growth through investments, the board should be aware of the negative association
between lawyer CEOs and capital expenditure that may be driven by litigation-risk aversion. While
there are many factors in addition to education affecting the choice for the company’s executive, and
no generalization that all lawyer CEOs invest less should be made, understanding the potential effect
may lead to better alignment of interests between the executive and the shareholders.
Higher cumulative announcement day returns associated with lawyer CEOs is the most
interesting new finding of the thesis. This result has several implications depending on its causality.
If lawyer CEOs indeed are better acquirers, be it by more effective target choice or better negotiation,
the effect has a natural explanation, although this type of interpretation is not empirically established.
Even if the acquisitions are not better, lawyer CEOs may be better in communicating towards
investors and thus surprise the market less with new acquisition announcements, tentatively supported
by the findings of Henderson et al. (2017) on earnings announcement returns. The result may also be
driven by lower likelihood of shareholder litigation when a lawyer is the CEO of the acquiring
company. These would be logical and valid explanations from a market effectiveness point of view
and should affect the type of CEOs highly acquisitive companies should consider. However, if the
effect is rather due to a market misconception of the lawyer CEOs abilities related to acquisitiveness,
or due to sweet talk not supported by actual performance, a potential market inefficiency is possible.
The differences in CAR are economically and statistically significant, and while establishing a causal
link between the observed better returns is out of the scope of this thesis, studying the relationship
between lawyer CEOs and acquisition returns is an attractive area of further research.
There are further potential explanations for the observed results that cannot be completely
controlled for in the thesis. CEOs do not make decision in their companies on their own but operate
with a management team and answer the board of directors. Thus, an interesting area of future
research is the top management composition of companies with lawyer CEOs. It is already
documented that lawyer CEOs are more likely to bring more lawyers to the top management team
and thus improve oversight (Litov et al. 2014, Henderson et al. 2017), but other management team
dynamics  may also  differ  and  thus  drive  results.  For  example,  CFOs are  left  out  of  this  study  for
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scoping purposes. Nevertheless, CFOs typically have an important influence on capital structure and
acquisitiveness (Huang and Kisgen 2013), and if lawyer CEOs have a different type of relationship
with their CFOs it may affect results. While it is easy to single out the CEO of a company, their stand-
alone impact on corporate policies is debatable and certainly to an extent affected by other executives.
Finally, a key factor with which the study could be extended is the incentive structure of the
executive. Lawyer directors are shown to improve the alignment of CEO and shareholder interests
(Litov et al. 2014), and if the same is true for lawyer CEOs it could explain better acquisitions from
the shareholders point of view. It is also possible that executives with a background in law are given
different types of incentive structures, or that former lawyers can negotiate a different type of
incentive structure. A wide scope of finance literature focuses on agency issues and their mitigation
through aligned interests and studying these issues from a lawyer CEO perspective may increase our
understanding of the factors behind the observed results. While age and tenure do, to an extent, proxy
for total compensation, it does not account for bonus structures, options or the share of stock in the
company. If, for example, lawyer CEOs would hold on average more shares of their own company,
they would be less incentivized in engaging in value-destroying acquisitions that could explain higher
announcement returns.
8. Conclusion
In this thesis I study the relationship between lawyer CEOs and corporate risk-taking in S&P
1500 companies. I document that companies with lawyer CEOs tend to invest less in tangible and
intangible assets, hold more debt and less cash, and have higher cumulative announcement day returns
for acquisitions. The results are not explained by general lawyer risk-aversion opposite to my initial
hypothesis, but rather suggest a litigation-risk-aversion which is only related to certain policies such
as investments, but not to others such as leverage. Furthermore, I do not find lawyer CEOs to exhibit
less overconfident stock purchasing behavior. The causal relation between lawyer CEOs and higher
announcement day returns is not empirically documented by this study, but I hypothesize it to relate
to more effective investor expectations management, a lowered litigation risk related to acquisitions
and more favorable acquisition negotiation outcomes. The explanations are in line with previous
research on lawyers and lawyer CEOs.
The findings of my thesis suggest that more research should be conducted on this specific group
of managers with a law degree. There are several potential areas of corporate finance research that
are left out of this study, such as studying incentive structures, innovation, IPOs or stock returns, that
may be affected by the presence of a lawyer CEO. Furthermore, evaluating the causality for the
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observed results, especially higher announcement day returns, is important to conclude whether we
are observing a rational phenomenon or a potential market inefficiency. Studying deal premiums paid
by lawyer CEOs could increase our understanding on whether lawyers overpay less for acquisitions,
which could be one of the determinants for higher announcement returns. Another interesting study
would be to analyze the lawyer CEO effect for target companies in takeover situations. The same
drivers, e.g. more effective investor communication, lower litigation risk or better negotiation
outcomes could be present when the CEO of a target company has legal expertise, and thus drive
better takeover outcomes such as higher takeover premiums or safer cash payments. Research on this
area would further improve our understanding about the value of lawyer CEOs in takeover situations.
Finally, CEO studies related to the executive’s previous career should not be restricted to a career
or education in law. There are plenty former consultants, investment bankers, scientists and
accountants leading large companies, and each group may have their own distinguishable effects on
corporate policies. Understanding these effects will increase our perception of how companies are
managed and improve board’s abilities to select executives and steer their decision making towards
shareholder-value maximizing firm policies. Studies focusing on executive work experience, such as
this thesis, will also guide investors in reacting towards CEO appointments and subsequent corporate
policy decisions and assist CEOs themselves in identifying and adjusting for potential biases that may
arise from their past careers and affect their decision making.
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Appendix A
Dependent variables
Variable Definition Primary source
CapEx Capital expenditure to net tangible assets Compustat
R&D Research and development expense to sales Compustat
Leverage Debt in current book liabilities plus long-term book debt to total book
assets
Compustat
Cash-to-assets The ratio of cash and marketable securities to total book assets Compustat
Pr(large acquisition) A binary variable with the value 1 if the company announces a large
acquisition i.e. one with a transaction value exceeding 5% of the
acquirer’s previous year market capitalization
SDC Platinum
N(large acquisition) The number of large acquisitions announced by the company during
the calendar year
SDC Platinum
CAR [-1, +1] 3-day cumulative abnormal return in percentage points surrounding the
announcement day of an acquisition
CRSP
Unrelated
acquisition
A binary variable with the value 1 if the acquisition target is in a
different 2-digic SIC industry than the acquirer
SDC Platinum
All stock acquisition A binary variable with the value 1 if the acquisition is financed fully
with the acquirer’s stock
SDC Platinum
Cross border bid A binary variable with the value 1 if the acquisition is a cross border
transaction
SDC Platinum
Not completed A binary variable with the value 1 if the acquisition is not completed SDC Platinum
Independent variables
Variable Definition Primary source
Lawyer CEO A binary variable with the value 1 if the CEO of the company has a
law degree (usually J.D.)
BoardEx
MBA CEO A binary variable with the value 1 if the CEO has an MBA degree BoardEx
Age The age of the CEO ExecuComp
Tenure The number of years as a CEO in the current company ExecuComp
Female A binary variable with the value 1 if the CEO is female EcecuComp
Log TA The natural logarithm of total book assets Compustat
ROA Net income to total book assets Compustat
Tobin’s q Total capitalisation (book assets plus market value of equity less book
value of equity) to book assets
Compustat
Asset tangibility Fixed book assets to total book assets Compustat
Sales growth The growth rate of total revenue from the previous year Compustat
Dividend paying A binary variable with the value 1 if the firm pays dividend during the
year
Compustat
Cash flow EBITDA less net interest, taxes and dividends paid to total
capitalisation
Compustat
Firm age The age of the company, defined as the difference between the current
year and the earliest record of the company on Compustat
Compustat
Industry The 2-digit NAICS code of the company, which are presented in Table
II
Compustat
Year The current calendar year Compustat
Return Market adjusted monthly return for the fiscal year CRSP
Volatility Standard deviation of monthly stock returns for the fiscal year CRSP
Relative deal value Transaction value to the acquirer’s previous year market capitalization SDC Platinum
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Private target A binary variable with the value 1 if the acquisition target is a private
company
SDC Platinum
Public target A binary variable with the value 1 if the acquisition target is a publicly
listed company
SDC Platinum
Tender offer A binary variable with the value 1 if the acquisition is pursued via
tender offer
SDC Platinum
Hostile bid A binary variable with the value 1 if the acquisition is hostile SDC Platinum
Challenged bid A binary variable with the value 1 if the acquisition is challenged SDC Platinum
Acquisitive
company
A binary variable with the value 1 if the company is in the top quadrant
of the sample measured by the average number of announced large
acquisitions per calendar year
SDC Platinum
Robustness tests
Variable Definition Primary source
Lawyer A binary variable with the value 1 if the company is a non-lawyer CEO
to lawyer-CEO transition company
BoardEx
Post A binary variable for whether the current year is after the transition of
non-lawyer CEO to lawyer CEO
BoardEx
Replaced in 4 years A binary variable with the value 1 if the CEO is replaced within 4
years of appointment
ExecuComp
Holder 67 A binary variable with the value 1 if the CEO has twice during the
sample period failed to execute options that are more than 67% in-the-
money
ExecuComp
Longholder A binary variable with the value 1 if the CEO has held options until the
last year of duration over the sample period
ExecuComp
Net buyer A binary variable with the value 1 if the CEO has bought stock on net
in more years than sold stock on net over the sample period
ExecuComp
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Appendix B
Table XX: Correlation table between variables
This table presents the correlations between CEO characteristics and firm-specific controls. All variables are defined in Appendix A, and firm characteristics are lagged by one year.
Lawyer
CEO
MBA
CEO Age Tenure Female
Cap
Ex R&D
Log
TA ROA
Tobin’s
q Leverage
Cash-
to-assets
Asset
tangibility
Dividend
paying
Revenue
growth
Cash
flow
Firm
age
Return Volatility
Lawyer
CEO
1.00
MBA
CEO
-0.19 1.00
Age 0.05 -0.03 1.00
Tenure 0.07 -0.10 0.47 1.00
Female -0.01 -0.01 -0.08 -0.08 1.00
CapEx -0.02 -0.03 -0.12 0.05 -0.01 1.00
R&D -0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.05 1.00
Log TA 0.03 0.05 0.10 -0.09 0.02 -0.18 -0.04 1.00
ROA 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.05 -0.09 0.06 1.00
Tobin’s q -0.02 -0.01 -0.08 0.04 -0.01 0.23 0.05 -0.11 0.26 1.00
Leverage 0.06 0.02 0.05 -0.05 -0.01 -0.20 -0.01 0.28 -0.12 -0.18 1.00
Cash-to-
assets
-0.04 -0.03 -0.12 0.08 0.01 0.25 0.07 -0.28 0.00 0.33 -0.37 1.00
Asset
Tangibility
0.05 -0.06 0.07 -0.01 -0.02 -0.26 -0.01 0.14 0.01 -0.13 0.21 -0.38 1.00
Dividend
paying
0.02 0.04 0.15 -0.05 0.02 -0.22 -0.03 0.32 0.13 -0.08 0.15 -0.31 0.18 1.00
Revenue
growth
0.00 -0.01 -0.04 0.04 -0.03 0.14 0.04 -0.03 0.10 0.21 -0.03 0.05 -0.02 -0.10 1.00
Cash flow 0.02 -0.01 0.05 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.07 0.04 0.34 -0.17 -0.02 -0.24 0.26 0.00 0.11 1.00
Firm age 0.05 0.09 0.14 -0.10 0.03 -0.23 -0.02 0.47 0.05 -0.15 0.18 -0.27 0.08 0.46 -0.13 -0.01 1.00
Return -0.01 .00 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.05 -0.06 0.15 0.25 -0.06 0.09 -0.02 -0.04 0.08 -0.04 -0.04 1.00
Volatility -0.03 -0.03 -0.10 0.03 -0.02 0.13 0.08 -0.30 -0.29 0.04 -0.05 0.20 -0.03 -0.30 -0.04 -0.11 -0.25 0.13 1.00
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Table XXI: Cumulative announcement day returns, subsample analysis, full table
This table shows the results of OLS regressions where the dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return in percentage points three days
surrounding the announcement day [-1 +1]. Columns 1-2 include acquisitions where the acquirer is an S&P 500 company. Columns 3-4 include
acquisitions that have a transaction value exceeding 10% of the acquirer’s previous year market capitalization. Columns 5-6 include acquisitions
where the target is a publicly listed company. Columns 7-8 include a randomized 50% subsample. The observations are on the transaction level.
Lawyer CEO is a binary variable that equals one if the company has a CEO with a law degree. All control variables are defined in Appendix A and
firm control variables are lagged by one year. Standard errors are presented in parentheses and are adjusted for potential heteroscedasticity. The
statistical significance of the coefficients is reported: *significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
S&P 500 acquirers (CAR) Very large deals (CAR) Public targets (CAR) Random 50% (CAR)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Lawyer CEO 0.019*** 0.022***
(0.008)
0.014*
(0.007)
0.015*
(0.008)
0.027***
(0.009)
0.022**
(0.010)
0.016**
(0.007)
0.014*
(0.007)
MBA CEO 0.001
(0.004)
0.001
(0.004)
0.006
(0.006)
0.002
(0.004)
Age 0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
Tenure 0.001*
(0.000)
0.001**
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.001*
(0.000)
Female -0.039*
(0.020)
-0.018
(0.015)
-0.049**
(0.024)
-0.029**
(0.014)
Log TA -0.009***
(0.002)
-0.008***
(0.002)
-0.011***
(0.002)
-0.006***
(0.002)
Tobin’s q -0.005**
(0.002)
-0.005**
(0.002)
-0.006***
(0.002)
0.001
(0.002)
Return 0.004
(0.007)
0.015**
(0.007)
0.012
(0.009)
0.014**
(0.006)
Volatility -0.041
(0.058)
-0.069
(0.054)
-0.126
(0.091)
-0.052
(0.055)
Cash flow 0.027
(0.079)
0.058
(0.063)
0.005
(0.092)
-0.026
(0.070)
Leverage 0.006
(0.015)
0.025
(0.016)
-0.003
(0.022)
0.012
(0.014)
Cash-to-assets -0.015
(0.019)
-0.001
(0.016)
-0.039*
(0.022)
-0.012
(0.014)
Firm age 0.000
(0.000)
0.000**
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
Unrelated
acquisition
-0.013***
(0.005)
-0.014***
(0.004)
-0.017***
(0.006)
-0.009**
(0.004)
All stock
acquisition
0.004
(0.010)
-0.006
(0.010)
-0.009
(0.010)
0.005
(0.011)
Relative deal
value
-0.018*
(0.009)
0.001
(0.006)
-0.027***
(0.008)
0.004
(0.007)
Private target 0.001
(0.006)
-0.004
(0.005)
-0.001
(0.005)
Public target -0.020***
(0.006)
-0.026***
(0.006)
-0.021***
(0.006)
Tender offer 0.002
(0.006)
0.004
(0.007)
0.003
(0.006)
-0.001
(0.007)
Hostile bid 0.020*
(0.012)
0.026**
(0.011)
0.013
(0.012)
0.003
(0.016)
Challenged bid 0.006
(0.011)
0.000
(0.009)
0.001
(0.009)
0.022*
(0.011)
Cross border
bid
-0.002
(0.004)
0.003
(0.005)
0.006
(0.007
-0.002
(0.004)
Fixed effects No Ind., Year No Ind., Year No Ind., Year No Ind., Year
Observations 1,048 1,048 1,480 1,480 746 746 1,206 1,206
Adjusted R2 0.009 0.208 0.003 0.185 0.013 0.244 0.005 0.170
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Table XXII: Announcement returns, different time intervals, full table
This table shows the results of OLS regressions where the dependent variable is the CAR in percentage points. Columns 1-2
include the announcement day, Columns 3-4 [-2, +2] days, Columns 5-6 [-1, +5] days and Columns 7-8 [-5, +5] days around the
announcement. The observations are on the transaction level and only include large acquisitions. Lawyer CEO is a binary variable
that equals one if the company has a CEO with a law degree. All control variables are defined in Appendix A and firm control
variables are lagged by one year. Standard errors are presented in parentheses and are adjusted for potential heteroscedasticity. The
statistical significance of the coefficients is reported: *significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
Announcement day CAR [-2, +2] CAR [-1, +5] CAR [-5, +5]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Lawyer CEO 0.002
(0.004)
0.002
(0.004)
0.014**
(0.005)
0.014**
(0.006)
0.012**
(0.005)
0.012**
(0.006)
0.008
(0.006)
0.008
(0.007)
MBA CEO -0.001
(0.002)
0.002
(0.003)
0.004
(0.004)
0.001
(0.004)
Age -0.000*
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
Tenure 0.000
(0.000)
0.001**
(0.000)
0.001**
(0.000)
0.001
(0.000)
Female -0.015**
(0.007)
-0.024**
(0.012)
-0.022*
(0.013)
-0.027*
(0.014)
Log TA -0.004***
(0.001)
-0.007****
(0.001)
-0.007***
(0.002)
-0.008***
(0.002)
Tobin’s q -0.003*
(0.002)
-0.002
(0.003)
-0.002
(0.003)
-0.003
(0.003)
Return 0.005
(0.003)
0.008
(0.005)
0.010*
(0.006)
0.007
(0.007)
Volatility 0.032
(0.026)
0.013
(0.045)
-0.048
(0.049)
-0.005
(0.053)
Cash flow 0.012
(0.030)
-0.046
(0.054)
-0.077
(0.058)
-0.105*
(0.062)
Leverage 0.008
(0.007)
0.010
(0.012)
0.016
(0.014)
0.017
(0.015)
Cash-to-assets 0.006
(0.008)
-0.018
(0.013)
-0.014
(0.014)
-0.016
(0.017)
Firm age 0.000**
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
Unrelated
acquisition
-0.007***
(0.002)
-0.006*
(0.003)
-0.011***
(0.004)
-0.009*
(0.004)
All stock
acquisition
-0.005
(0.006)
-0.009
(0.009)
-0.015
(0.010)
-0.009
(0.010)
Relative deal
value
-0.004
(0.004)
-0.001
(0.006)
0.002
(0.006)
-0.002
(0.006)
Private target -0.006**
(0.002)
-0.004
(0.004)
-0.005
(0.004)
-0.005
(0.005)
Public target -0.014***
(0.003)
-0.024***
(0.005)
-0.021***
(0.005)
-0.018***
(0.006)
Tender offer 0.004
(0.004)
0.009
(0.006)
0.007
(0.007)
0.001
(0.008)
Hostile bid 0.015**
(0.007)
0.018*
(0.010)
0.008
(0.013)
0.008
(0.014)
Challenged bid -0.003
(0.005)
-0.002
(0.009)
-0.003
(0.009)
-0.017*
(0.009)
Cross border bid 0.000
(0.002)
-0.001
(0.004)
0.002
(0.004)
0.003
(0.004)
Fixed effects No Ind., Year No Ind., Year No Ind., Year No Ind., Year
Observations 2,382 2,382 2,382 2,382 2,380 2,380 2,378 2,378
Adjusted R2 0.000 0.111 0.003 0.112 0.002 0.100 0.001 0.087
